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WRECKING THE LAW: HOW ARTICLE III
OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED
STATES LED TO THE DISCOVERY OF A
LAW OF STANDING TO SUE IN NIGERIA
Tunde I. Ogowewo*
I.

INTRODUCTION

Is it possible for a legal system to have one rule of locus
standi' applicable in all doctrinal contexts regardless of the
cause of action or remedy sought? This surely must be the
question that any perceptive observer of the Nigerian legal
system is bound to ask. That legal system is the only one - to
the knowledge of this writer - that has one rule of locus standi
applicable in every area of public and private law in federal
and state courts. Hence, there is now such a thing known as
the Nigerian law of standing to sue. The provenance of this
law is section 6(6)(b) of the 1979 Nigerian Constitution (now
section 6(6)(b) of the 1999 Constitution).'

* MCIArb; LLB (Hons) (Benin); LLM (LSE, University of London)., PhD
(King's College London, University of London). Member of the Nigerian Bar. Lecturer in the School of Law, King's College London, University of London. The
financial support for this research was generously provided out of the Research
Fund of the School of Law, King's College London. I wish to record my immense
gratitude to my research assistant, Abena Asiamah.
1. The term "locus standi" is often used interchangeably with terms such as
"standing to sue" or "title to sue." According to Sir Konrad Schiemann, the "obvious effect of locus standi rules in any legal system is to exclude some people from
obtaining the assistance of the courts in declaring and enforcing the law in circumstances where others could obtain that assistance." See K. Schiemann, Locus
Standi, P.L. 342 (1990); P. Cane, The Function of Standing Rules in Administrative Law, P.L. 303 (1980) (on the functions of standing rules). See also K.E. Scott,
Standing in the Supreme Court - A Functional Analysis, 86 HARV. L. REV. 645
(1973); T.A. CROMWELL, LOCUS STANDI: A COMMENTARY ON THE LAW OF STANDING

IN CANADA 9-11 (1986).
2. Nigeria has had a checkered constitutional history. The Supremacy Clause
of the 1979 Constitution (a constitution that was largely the product of an elected
constituent assembly of citizens) was purportedly suspended by the military in the
coup of December 31, 1983. When the military finally departed in 1999, this Constitution was abrogated, see Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria (Certain Consequential Repeals) Decree No. 63, 1999, and a new document, termed the
CONSTITUTION OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF NIGERIA 1999, was imposed on the

country by the military administration with the promulgation of the Constitution
of the Federal Republic of Nigeria (Promulgation) Decree No. 24 1999.
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Ever since the standing rule was assumed to have been
discovered by the Nigerian Supreme Court in Adesanya v.
President of the FederalRepublic of Nigeria,' the law reports
have become littered with cases on the standing rule.4 Consequently, the rule has attracted considerable academic ink.5 Its
prominence even extends beyond legal circles. Nigerian newspapers are replete with stories of cases being thrown out of
court for lack of standing.6 For this reason, the term "locus

Quite apart from the fact that this Constitution is not legitimate - it was
not the product of a constituent assembly of elected citizens or the subject of a
referendum - it is this writer's view that it is void for the following reason. A
constitution is the expression of a people's will. This will, like a person's opinion,
cannot be altered by fiat. When a decree purports to suspend the supremacy of a
constitution, it purports to suspend the will of a people. This is a conceptual impossibility. Hence, the notion of suspension ought to be deconstructed. Doing that
calls attention to the fact that what really happens when a decree purports to
suspend the supremacy of a constitution is that it impairs the expression and
enforcement of the will of the people to govern themselves in accordance with the
constitution's terms. It is similar to the case of a foreign invader that invades a
country and rules it. The will of the invaded people as to how they shall be governed does not disappear - it still remains - but the expression and enforcement
of this will is impaired through superior force. When the invader leaves, the impediment to the expression and enforcement of the will disappears, and, therefore,
the will (in the form of the constitution that was purportedly abrogated) reasserts
itself. Accordingly, with the departure of the military in May 1999, the impediment to the enforcement of the 1979 Constitution disappeared. All that remains is
for the courts to pronounce the 1979 Constitution as Nigeria's true constitution.
This thesis is developed in a forthcoming article. See T.I. Ogowewo, Why the Judicial Annulment of the Constitution of 1999 is Imperative for the Survival of
Nigeria's Democracy 44 J. AF. L. 133 (2000). If a court strikes down the 1999
Constitution, it will, however, have no effect on the subject of this article, since
the source of the standing to sue problem is the same in both the 1979 and 1999
Constitutions.
3. Adesanya v. President of the Fed. Republic of Nig., 1 All N.L.R. (Part 1) 1
(1981).
4. Tobi J.C.A. observed that the rule, "in recent times has gained so much
prominence in our legal system." Busari v. Oseni, 4 N.W.L.R. 557, 585D (1992).
Kolawole J.C.A. said, "In recent times the courts have had to deal so frequently
with questions of locus standi." Bolaji v. Bamgbose, 4 N.W.L.R. 632, 648A (1986).
In fact, the law reports understate this phenomenon, since they report only appellate decisions.
5. The plethora of academic writing is a post-Adesanya phenomenon. In fact,
no article on the subject appeared in the Nigerian Bar Journal from its inception
in 1957 until 1983, when B.A. Susu's article appeared in Vol. XIX, No. 2. The
Nigerian Law Journal equally did not feature any article on the subject from its
inception in 1964 until 1986 when Vol. 13 was published. This was also the case
with The Nigerian Journal of Contemporary Law, which began life in 1970 - no
article on the subject was published until Vol. 17, in 1993.
6. See CJ Rules on Locus for Suit Against Nnamani Today, June 21, 1999,
POST EXPRESS (reading, "Enugu State Chief Judge, Justice Jacob Ugwu, would
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standi"has even entered the lexicon of the layperson in Nigeria.'
Since it does not require any great feat of imagination to
appreciate that the application of a single locus standi rule
throughout the entire breadth of the law must inevitably lead
to colossal problems,' our notional observer is bound to ask
whether Nigerian judges have somehow discovered the holy
grail on the principle of standing. This is hardly the case. It
will be seen that the rule is a gigantic conceptual mistake.
Like General Sherman's march across Georgia, the rule has
wreaked and is still wreaking havoc across the entire face of
Nigerian law, colliding with and demolishing settled legal
principles in its wake in different areas of public and private
law. Although the rule bars representative standing,' this arti-

today rule on the locus of a women's coalition in the state to file a suit, seeking
to restrain Governor Chimaroke Nnamani from inaugurating an all-male State
More articles concerning locus standi are available at
Executive Council.")
http://www.postexpresswired.com.
7. "Nigeria has no locus standi or moral right to insist on democracy when it
is practising dictatorship." 0. Ukeh, Of Hypocrisy and the Sierra Leone Drama,
POST EXPRESS, June 16, 1997 (where the author shows his familiarity with the
term "locus standi").
8. Schiemann, supra note 1, at 343. "The task of formulating general principles becomes more complex the more you seek to embrace by one rule, particularly
if the rule has different objectives in different cases. The problem can only be
solved by making the rules very complex or very vague. The problem is sidestepped to a degree by having different rules, if thought desirable, in different
branches of litigation." Id. It will be seen that by applying one rule of standing in
all branches of the law, considerable problems - which have neither been sidestepped nor solved - have been caused.
9. There is a distinction between those who seek to establish standing on the
basis of their own personal interests (personal standing) and those who do so on
the basis that they represent the interests of other identifiable individuals, or that
they represent the "public interest" (representative standing). See P. Cane, Standing Up for the Public, P.L. 276 (1995). It will be seen that the Nigerian standing
rule has a very narrow concept of personal standing (one that focuses on private
legal rights) and no concept of representative standing. Hence, persons with a real
interest in an issue of local or national importance invariably will be denied
standing; even if what is assailed involves obvious illegality. See Adesanya, 1 All
N.L.R. (Part 1) 1 (for a decision illustrating the narrow concept of personal standing); Nigerian Soft Drinks Co. Ltd. v. Attorney-General of Bendel State, 5 N.C.L.R.
656 (1984) (for a decision illustrating the absence of a concept of representative
standing).
An analytical application of the standing rule should deny standing to nongovernmental organisations (NGOs) that represent the "public interest," if their
legal rights are not in question. This has serious implications for the enforcement
of environmental law, an area where NGOs have a crucial role to play. See 0.
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cle shall employ the more egregious cases to demonstrate the
rule's absurdity and the injustice that it causes. Postulate the
following scenarios:
(a) Guidelines are published by the Ministry of Finance containing the conditions that are to be satisfied before a banking licence can be granted. An applicant complies with all the
conditions. The Minister of Finance refuses to grant the
licence on an extraneous ground. As Nigerian courts will view
this as ultra vires,'0 the applicant brings an application for
judicial review under the Application for Judicial Review
Procedure (AJR) contained in Order 46 of the Federal High
Court Civil Procedure Rules." Yet the court rules that the
applicant has no locus standi.The court pronounces that this
prevents it from looking into the merits of the case."
(b) A company that intends to build a facility has a duty
under the Environmental Impact Assessment Act of 1992 to
carry out preliminary studies on the facility's environmental
impact. An environmental activist resident in the area where
the project is to be sited is not satisfied that the company has
satisfactorily adhered to the provisions of the statute. He
consequently institutes an action to restrain the company
from carrying on with the project until a proper environmen-

Ogbalu, Environmental Regulation in Nigeria, 6 O.G.T.L.R. 163, 166 (1992). It has
been suggested that environmental NGOs may enforce the law only by suing the
Federal Environmental Protection Agency (F.E.P.A.) pursuant to § 29 of the
F.E.P.A Act. See O.A. Bowen, The Role of Private Citizens in the Enforcement of
Environmental Laws, in ENVIRONMENTAL LAws IN NIGERIA INCLUDING COMPENSATION Ch. 11 (J.A. Omotola ed., 1990). This is doubtful. Indeed, Bowen does acknowledge that, "[tlo the extent that section 29 merely implies but does not specifically grant a general right to sue to individuals, it does not provide a reliable
basis for citizen enforcement." Id. at 163. Even if the provision granted a general
right to sue, it is likely that the existing standing rule will force the courts to
strike down the provision as unconstitutional, on the ground that it purports to
give standing where the constitutional threshold has not been reached. See infra
text accompanying notes 67-68.
10. See Iwuji v. Fed. Comm'r for Establishments, 1 N.W.L.R. 497 (1985);
Stitch v. Attorney-General of the Fed'n, 5 N.W.L.R. 1007 (1986).
11. The court with jurisdiction in respect of this matter is the Federal High
Court. Order 46 of the Federal High Court (Civil Procedure Rules) Act 1999 deals
with the "Application for Judicial Review" (AJR) procedure. It is based on Order
53 of the Rules of the Supreme Court of England. State High Courts also have an
AJR procedure. See High Court of Lagos State (Civil Procedure) Law (1994), Cap.
61, Order 43.
12. The Supreme Court recently pointed out that, "ilt must be remembered
that the issue of locus standi is not dependent on the success or merits of a case."
Adesokan v. Adegorolu, 3 N.W.L.R. 261, 278H (1997).
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tal impact assessment has been conducted. The court rules
that the plaintiff has no locus standi.
(c) There is political violence and a person is killed. The suspects are prosecuted, but the Governor of the State instructs
the Solicitor-General to enter a nolle prosequi. The father of
the deceased, incensed that justice is being thwarted, enlists
the engine of the law to declare the nolle unconstitutional.
This is because the Constitution provides that only the Attorney-General of a State can enter a nolle prosequi. The court,
however, rules that the father has no locus standi to challenge the unconstitutional entry of the nolle.
(d) A shareholder in a registered private company is excluded by his fellow shareholders from the management of the
"quasi-partnership." The shareholder is naturally aggrieved
because his expectations have been thwarted."3 Under most
systems of Anglo-company law, including Nigerian company
law, the shareholder will be unable to bring an action because, in the absence of a shareholders' agreement to the
contrary, a shareholder has no original right to participate in
management. 4 The only way that the shareholder will be
able to sue is by using an oppression remedy. 5 Hence the
aggrieved shareholder petitions the court for relief under
section 311 of the Companies and Allied Matters Act of 1990,
on the ground that he has been treated in an oppressive
manner. Under this jurisdiction, a court can intervene even
though the shareholder's legal rights have not been infringed
upon by the company. So in trekking to court, the shareholder is confident that his petition will be heard. Yet the court
rules that he has no locus standi.
(e) There is a public nuisance and a million homes are trivially affected. A million plaintiffs individually file suit at once.
The tortfeasor argues that the plaintiffs lack locus standi and
that the appropriate plaintiff is the Attorney-General, since a
public nuisance is a public wrong. This argument is rested on
the ground that a principal reason for the principle of stand-

13. Such as the expectation of directorial influence and remuneration, especially where the company, as in the case of most quasi-partnerships, follows a policy
of not declaring dividends but instead pays out the profits of the company in the
form of directors' fees.
14. A personal action is impossible because the shareholder's personal rights
have not been infringed. A derivative action is also impossible since none of the
company's rights have been infringed.
15. See, e.g., § 459 of the British Companies Act 1985.
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ing is to prevent the courts from being overwhelmed in such
a situation; hence, the Attorney-General, as the protector of
the public interest, should bring suit on behalf of the litigants. To be sure, the common law of England, as applied in
Nigeria,16 recognizes this role of the Attorney-General."
Yet the court rules that all one million litigants have locus
standi, with the result that the court is overwhelmed and
only a few see justice done.
(f) Where the defendant in the High Court has not questioned the plaintiffs standing, the defendant can raise the
issue either in the Court of Appeal" or the Supreme
Court. 9 Indeed, any court can raise the question suo
moto.2° This is because in both public and private law the
courts view the standing rule as a rule governing the jurisdiction of the court,2 which can be raised at any stage of
the proceedings. 2 The onus is on the plaintiff to establish
his standing.' The conclusion that the plaintiff lacks standing automatically results in a lack of jurisdiction.24 If the
case is not struck out, the court's subsequent proceedings,
including its judgements or its orders, will be a nullity.2
(g) Where the standing rule collides with rules of standing in
other contexts (i.e. in private26 and public law27), that as-

16. See Ipadeola v. Oshowole, 3 N.W.L.R. 18 (1987).
17. An exception to this rule under the common law was where the plaintiff
could show that he had suffered "special damage." See Fowlers v. Saunders Cro.
Jac. 446 (1617) 76 KB., E.R. 382. See also J.R. Spencer, Public Nuisance - A
critical examination, 48 C.L.J. 55 (1989) (for a critical review of the tort of public
nuisance).
18. See Akinbinu v. Oseni, 1 N.W.L.R. 97, 110 (1992).
19. See Kilfco Ltd. v. Philipp Holzmann A.G., 3 N.W.L.R. 276, 292B (1996).
20. See Rd. Transp. Employers Ass'n of Nig. v. Nat'l Union of Rd. Transp.
Workers, 2 N.W.L.R. 381 (1992). qee also Akintola v. Balogun, 1 N.W.L.R. 532,
545G (2000) (holding that locus siandi, "is a fundamental issue and no court is
therefore competent to raise it suo motu and decide it without hearing from the
parties.").
21. See Ojukwu v. Kaine, 9 N.W.L.R. 613, 628C-F (1997).
22. "There is no doubt that the issue, which really goes to jurisdiction, could
be raised at any stage, and certainly, there would be nothing wrong with its being
raised, even for the first time, here." Oredoyin v. Arowolo, 4 N.W.L.R. 172, 187C
(1989).
23. See Attorney-General, Enugu State v. Omaba, 1 N.W.L.R. 95 (1998).
24. See Tidex (Nig.) Ltd. v. Nupeng, 11 N.W.L.R. 263, 279F (1998). See also
Owners M/V Baco Liner 3 v. Adeniji, 2 N.W.L.R. 195, 202D (1993).
25. See Labaran v. Okoye, 4 N.W.L.R. 303 (1995).
26. See, e.g., Foss v. Harbottle, 2 Hare 461 (1843) (for the rule in company
law).
27. See, e.g., the "sufficient interest" test in the AJR procedure.
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pect of Nigerian law is invariably re-written. Whole swathes
law are being re-written without any end in
of Nigerian
28
view.

These seven strange results prompt one to wonder whether the courts have simply forgotten what the principle of standing to sue encompasses. Even in the face of results so unreasonable in their defiance of common sense and justice, the
standing rule has not become the subject of judicial animadversion. Quite to the contrary, it is hailed as an important discovery.29 Academics have fared no better. The vast majority simply provide descriptive accounts of the law, while a few venture beyond this to attack results of the standing rule without
appreciating that it is the rule itself that needs attacking. °

28. See infra Part IV.
29. See Ovie-Whiskey v. Olawoyin, 6 N.C.L.R. 156, 191 (1985).
30. See the following books on the Nigerian law of standing to sue: G.O.
OYUDO, Locus STANDI AND DECLARATORY ACTIONS (1987); M.A.A. OZEKHOME, THE
NIGERIAN LAW OF Locus STANDI (1988); I.E. SAGAY, LEGACY FOR POSTERITY WORK OF THE SUPREME COURT Ch. 8 (1988); P.A. OLUYEDE, NIGERIAN ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 504-511 (1988); A.G. Karibi-Whyte, Consideration of Preliminary Objections: Locus Standi, in JUDICIAL LECTURES: CONTINUING EDUCATION FOR THE JUDICIARY Ch. 8 (1991); O.A Bowen, Locus Standi in the Enforcement of Public Rights
in Nigeria, in ISSUES IN NIGERIAN LAW 30 (J.A Omotola ed., 1991)[hereinafter
O.A. Bowen]; C. OKPALUBA, JUDICIAL APPROACH TO CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION IN NIGERIA Ch. 7 (1992); N. TOBI, THE NIGERIAN JUDGE Ch. 5 (1992); M.I.
Jegede, Problem of Locus Standi (Standing to Sue) in The Administration of Justice, in NIGERIAN ESSAYS IN JURISPRUDENCE Ch. 10 (T.O. Elias and M.I. Jegede
eds., 1993); Y. Akinseye-George, Towards a Wider Concept of Locus Standi in the
(sic) Nigerian Constitutional Adjudication, in JUSTICE KAYODE Eso & THE CHALLENGE OF SUBSTANTIAL JUSTICE IN NIGERIA 25 (1993); W. Owaboye, Denial of
Justice and Concept of Locus Standi in Nigeria, in FUNDAMENTAL LEGAL ISSUES IN
NIGERIA: ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF JUSTICE OBASEKI Ch. 8 (W. Owaboye ed., 1995);
T. FAGBOHUNGBE, THE JUDICIAL UNIVERSE OF JUSTICE KAYODE ESO Ch. 5 (1995).
See G. Fawehinmi, Constitutional LawItomment No. 1, 2 N.C.L.R. v-viii
(1981); J.O. Akande, The Problem of Locus Standi in Judicial Review, 3 NIG. CURRENT L. REV. 42 (1982); B.A. Susu, Locus Standi, The Constitution (1979) and
Confusion in the Courts, 19 NIG. BAR J. (No. 2) 81 (1983); E.I. Quansah, Locus
Standi and the Interpretation of the Nigerian Constitution, 1 CALABAR L. J. 17
(1986); O.. Bowen, Locus Standi in Public Law: Its Bases and Rationale, 11 NIG.
CURRENT L. REV. 109 (1987); 0.1. Igboanugo, The Doctrine of Locus Standi: An
Appraisal, 2 U.I.L.S.J. 29 (1989); Y. Akinseye-George, Locus Standi in Nigerian
Constitutional Adjudication: Which Way Forward, 1 JUST. (No. 7) 39 (1990); L.A.
Atsegbua, Locus Standi: Beyond Section 6(6)(b) of the '79 Constitution, 2 R.AD.I.C.
314 (1990)[hereinafter Atsegbual; I.N.E. Worugji, Individual Enforcement of Public
Law and the Problem of Locus Standi in Nigeria, 3 CALABAR L.J. 142 (1990); AA.
Jimoh, Locus Standi: What Quantum of Interest Does The Court Require?, 20 THE
LAW 20 (1990); K-M. Mowoe, The Concept of Locus Standi Under the Constitution
of Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1979, in ESSAYS ON NIGERIAN LAW 103 (J.A
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So the courts receiving no assistance from the academy have
been left to wallow in a quagmire of their own devising. That
they sometimes strive, through dubious means,3 ' to avoid the
egregious consequences flowing from an analytical application
of the rule is irrelevant. Apart from indicating that the judges
may not fully understand their own rule - and this is worrying
considering that some Supreme Court justices can be charged
with this failing - a failure to apply the standing rule correctly
only adds the vice of uncertainty to the existing problem. This
is another reason why the locus standi rule in Nigeria has
caused great confusion.32 Hence, what should be relevant to
those interested in genuine reform is that a rule exists for
which the correct application (a) produces grave injustice; (b)
subverts a key rationale behind the standing principle; and (c)
re-writes (to no useful purpose) many areas of Nigerian law.
Considerable judicial and academic ink has been spilled on
the subject, yet the source of the problem has eluded courts
and commentators. However, in 1995 this author identified the
root of the problem in a published article33 and in 1998 the
Omotola, ed. 1990); M.A. Owoade, Locus Standi, Criminal Law and the Rights of
the Private Prosecutor in Nigeria: Fawehinmi v. Akilu and Togun Revisited, 1
JUST. (No. 7) 103 (1990) (reprinted in 4 NIG. JUD. REV. 109 (1989-90)); G.O.
Oyudo, The Locus Standi Syndrome in Nigerian Public Law, 2 JUST. (No.1) 15
(1991); J.N. Aduba, Judicial Interpretation of the Principle of Locus Standi in
Matters Relating to Local Government in Nigeria, 4 JUST. (No.3) 36 (1993); and A.
Okoh Alubo, Justice Denied? The Concept of Locus Standi in Nigeria, 42 U. JOS
L.J. 143 (1991-94).
It is surprising that, apart from a few exceptions, this voluminous literature
involves little or no discourse between the various writers. This has to do partly
with how articles are published in Nigeria. As law journals have suffered a demise, law schools tend to publish collections of articles (ranging from Islamic law
to Corporate law in one volume) under unhelpful broad titles. So it is very difficult to ascertain from the title whether or not an article on a particular area has
been published. Furthermore, because Nigerian law libraries are under-funded it is
difficult for law researchers to do any meaningful research. The effect of all this is
that academics now write articles without knowing what others have written. See
U. Lamikanra, Legal Research and the Legal Profession, in NIG. CURRENT LEGAL
PROBS. 114 (I.A. Ayua ed., 1998).
31. See Attorney-General, Kaduna State v. Hassan, 2 N.W.L.R. 483 (1985).
32. Oputa J.S.C. confessed that, "lilt is on the issue of locus standi that I
cannot pretend that I have not had some serious headache." Id. at 521G. Oputa
J.S.C. has said, "prudence will dictate that the issue of locus standi be shelved for
a more direct and a more opportune occasion . . . Discretion, they say, is the
better part of valour." Oredoyin v. Arowolo, 4 N.W.L.R. 172, 211C (1989). See also
Fawehinmi v. Akilu, 4 N.W.L.R. 797, 846C (1987) (citing the need for the courts
to tread "carefully 'on the soil of locus standi").
33. T.I. Ogowewo, The Problem With Standing To Sue in Nigeria, 39 J. AFR.
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Lagos Division of the Court of Appeal in N.N.P.C v.
Fawehinmi3 4 provided firm judicial support for the thesis of
the article. Yet, such is the nature of the problem that the
significance of these developments have gone unnoticed. Five
years hence the application of the standing rule has continued
inexorably and more damage has been done to Nigerian law.
One suspects that the reason for this is that most judges and
practitioners do not apprehend that there is even a problem to
be solved. Operating within the framework of the standing
rule, they fail to perceive its defects. The aim of this article is
to provide a solution to this intractable problem. It is only
through the demolition of the structure of the existing standing
rule that the solution to the problem can be realized. Accordingly, it supplies the forensic arguments for this demolition
exercise. On the ruins of the demolished structure, the article
re-discovers the correct rules of standing in private and public
law.
II. THE CAUSE OF THE PROBLEM
The problem with standing to sue in Nigeria arises from
the construction placed by the courts on section 6(6)(b) of the
Nigerian Constitution. Although neither the text of section
6(6)(b) nor its pre-enacting history would suggest to our notional observer that it deals with standing to sue, a standing rule
has been discovered in this "innocuous provision." 5 Section
6(6)(b) provides as follows:
The judicial powers vested in accordance with the foregoing

L. 1 (1995) [hereinafter Ogowewo].
34. 7 N.W.L.R. 598 (1998).
35. It is for this reason that commentators on the Constitution - before the
Adesanya case - never made the link between standing and § 6(6)(b). See, e.g., H.
CHAND, NIGERIAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (1981); B.O. NWABUEZE, THE PRESIDENTIAL
CONSTITUTION OF NIGERIA (1982); J. AKANDE, THE CONSTITUTION OF THE FEDERAL
REPUBLIC OF NIGERIA 1979 - WITH ANNOTATIONS (1982). See Report of the Constitution Drafting Committee Vol. I, Ch. 8 (1976) [hereinafter Report on the Constitution](for the Constitution's pre-enacting history). See also Report of the Sub-Committee on the Judicial System, in Report of the Constitution Drafting Committee,
Vol. II, 101-25 (1976) (wherein nothing on locus standi was mentioned). Even the
military government that promulgated the Constitution into law did not have this
in mind. See 0. OBASANJO, CONSTITUTION FOR NATIONAL INTEGRATION AND DEVELOPMENT 101-109 (1989) (discussing judicial power).
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provisions of this section shall extend to all matters between
persons, or between government or authority and any person
in Nigeria, and to all actions and proceedings relating thereto, for the determination of any question as to the civil rights
and obligations of that person. 6
By some kind of alchemy the courts transmuted a constitutional provision that seemingly has no bearing on the standing
principle into one that contains a rule of standing to be applied
in all areas of the law. How this strange discovery was made,
under the influence of a poor understanding of Article III of
the U.S. Constitution, is a matter that we shall address in due
course. According to Bello J.S.C.:
[Section 6(6)(b)] expresses the scope and content of the judicial powers vested by the Constitution in the courts within
the purview of the subsection. Although the powers appear
wide, they are limited in scope and content to only matters,
actions, and proceedings 'for the determination of any question as to the civil rights and obligations of that person.' . . .
It is only when the civil rights and obligations of the person,
who invokes the jurisdiction of the court, are in issue for
determination that the judicial powers of the courts may be
invoked. 7
From these premises, the courts derived a rule of standing
which can be stated thus: it is the law of Nigeria that a litigant will be granted access to the courts only where the litigant can point to the infringement or threatened infringement
of his civil right, but will be denied such access if no such right
has been infringed or threatened, with the result that the
court will be unable to assume jurisdiction to hear the case.
Accordingly, "in determining the issue of locus standi, at whatever level in the adjudication process, a court of law must
constantly bear in mind that its judicial powers are being invoked and the matters in which the judicial powers can be
exercised are as contained in the provisions of section 6(6)(b) of
the [1999] Constitution."38 The test for the application of this
rule has been formulated by Bello J.S.C. in the following
terms:

36. See NIG. CONST. § 6(6)(b).
37. The assumed discoverer of this rule. See Adesanya, 1 All N.L.R. (Part 1)
at 39.
38. Dagazau Carpets Ltd. v. Borkir Intl Ltd., 7 N.W.L.R. 293, 303H (1997).
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standing will only be accorded to a plaintiff who shows that
his civil rights and obligations have been or are in danger of
being violated or adversely affected by the act complained
of.39

Clearly, the key words in section 6(6)(b) are "civil rights."
The legislative history of the provision does not suggest any
explicit decision by the Constitution's framers to use those
words, as presently understood, in section 6. It was the draft-

ers - who incidentally were not expert draftsmen 4° - that inserted the term in section 6. The origin of this term can be

traced to Nigeria's Independence Constitution of 1960. 4" The
penultimate constitutional conference had recommended that a

bill of fundamental rights modeled along the lines of the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms42 should be written into the constitution.4 3 In providing for the right to a fair hearing in Article 6,
the European Convention had used the term "civil rights" to
refer to the underlying matter with respect to which there may
be a judicial determination and with respect to which a fair

hearing should be guaranteed.'

This explains how the term

39. 1 All N.L.R. (Part 1) at 39 (1981). See also Ogbuehi v. Gov. of Imo State,
9 N.W.L.R. 53, 84 (1995); Unitex Ltd. v. Yakubu, 13 N.W.L.R. 334, 344 (1998);
Ogunmokun v. Military Adm'r, Osun State, 3 N.W.L.R. 261, 285 (1999); Okafor v.
Asoh, 3 N.W.L.R. 35, 54 (1999).
40. See The Report of the Constitution, supra note 35, Ch. 4 (stating that,
"the Committee agreed that the work of putting the conclusions of the Committee
into the form of a Constitutional Instrument should be referred to the lawyer
members of the Committee subject to the directive that they should use simple
English as far as practicable."). The Constitution Drafting Committee subsequently
appointed the Legal Sub-Committee for the purpose of preparing a legal draft
based on agreed conclusions. In view of how the Constitution Drafting Committee
was composed, it is obvious that those who drafted the 1979 Constitution did not
do so because of their expertise in drafting; it was simply because they happened
to be lawyers who found themselves on the Constitution Drafting Committee. See
NWABUEZE, supra note 35, at 2.
41. See NIG. CONST. § 21.
42. European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221 [hereinafter Human Rights Convention].
43. See Report by the Resumed Nigerian Constitutional Conference (1958)
Cmnd. 569.
44. Article 6(1) provides, "In the determination of his civil rights and obligations or of any criminal charge against him, everyone is entitled to a fair and
public hearing within a reasonable time by an independent and impartial tribunal
established by law. Judgment shall be pronounced publicly, but the press and pub-
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came to be used in Nigeria's first post-independence constitution and how it ultimately found its way into Chapter IV of the
1979 (and 1999) Constitutions. Unfortunately, the drafters of
section 6 of the 1979 Constitution inserted the term into section 6(6)(b) without any knowledge of the jurisprudence that
had developed around the term. This jurisprudence had wrongly equated "civil rights" with "private legal rights." (This
incognizance of existing case law continued when section
6(6)(b) of the 1999 Constitution was drafted, since it completely reproduced section 6(6)(b) of the 1979 Constitution.) This is
the first in a series of errors that led to the present standing
rule. That the Constitution Drafting Committee was particularly error prone is not a matter that admits any doubt. For instance, their report states, "the actual drafting of this draft
Constitution had to be accomplished under a severe pressure
on our time . . . [and therefore] . . . the draft which follows
hereafter had to be prepared within an exceedingly short time.
. . [All these mean that there must, invariably, be mistakes
in the draft which, had we had more time, it may have been
possible for us to put right."45
*

The term "civil rights" has been construed to mean "private legal rights."' According to the Supreme Court in

lic may be excluded from all or part of the trial in the interest of morals, public
order or national security in a democratic society, where the interests of juveniles
or the protection of the private life of the parties so require, or to the extent
strictly necessary in the opinion of the court in special circumstances where publicity would prejudice the interests of justice." Human Rights Convention, supra note
42, at art. 6, para. 1.
45. Report of the Constitution, supra note 35, at Ch. 38.
46. Adesanya, 1 All N.L.R. (Part 1) at 39. See Attorney-General, Kaduna State
v. Hassan, 2 N.W.L.R. 483, 508D, 509A-B (1985); Thomas v. Olufosoye, 1 N.W.L.R.
669, 691E-F (1986); Odeneye v. Efunuga, 7 N.W.L.R. 618, 639E-F (1990); Badejo v.
Fed'l Minister of Ed., L.R.C. (Const.) 735 (1990) (where Babalakin J.C.A. was of
the view that the plaintiff had a personal right to be admitted into a Federal
Government College on the basis of her 73.25% examination score and, therefore,
she had locus standi to challenge a quota system which had the effect of denying
her a place). See also Alofoje v. F.H.A., 6 N.W.L.R. 559, 567G (1996); Adegbite v.
Raji, 4 N.W.L.R. 478, 488A-C (1992); Amodu v Obayomi, 5 N.W.L.R. 503, 512F513C (1992). In Ejiwunmi v. Costain (W.A) Plc., Musdapher J.C.A. states, "The
issue that now has to be decided is whether the statement of claim has disclosed
any personal legal right for which the respondent is entitled to any remedy and if
at all they have a right which has been violated." 12 N.W.L.R. 149, 164H (1998).
Uwaifo J.C.A. said, in Olagbegi v. Ogunoye I, that for there to be locus standi,
"the statement of claim must disclose a cause of action vested in the plaintiffs
regarding their rights or obligations which have been violated in the subject-mat-
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Odeneye v. Efunuga,47 such rights can be conferred by the
Constitution," a statute,49 the common law,5" or customary
law.5 ' The genesis of the equation of "civil right" with "private
legal right" can be traced to the Nigerian Supreme Court's
decision in Merchants Bank Ltd., v. Federal Minister of Finance,5 where the court construed the term "civil rights" as
not including privileges. The Supreme Court held that a refusal to grant a license was simply the denial of a privilege, and if
that was so, it did not involve a determination of the
applicant's civil rights. Writing in the first volume of The Nigerian Law Journal,R.B. Seidman presciently observed that, "if
the case heralds the law which is to be, it may fairly be said to
be a disaster for Nigerian law."53 Seidman's fear was that
"[bly excluding Hoffeldian 'privileges' from the phrase 'civil

ter." 5 N.W.L.R. 332, 352 (1996). See generally In re Adetona, 3 N.W.L.R. 481,
488E-F (1994) (where Tobi J.CA. said, "Locus standi can only arise from a right
cognisable and conferred on the plaintiff by law. Where there is no such right, the
plaintiff cannot be said to have a standing (sic) to commence or institute the action."); Attorney-General of Anambra State v. Eboh, 1 N.W.L.R. 491, 505F-G, 510B
(1992); Busari v. Oseni, 4 N.W.L.R. 557, 587-589 (1992); Albion Const. Ltd. v. Rao
Invs. Ltd., N.W.L.R. 583, 593D-H (1992).
The courts sometimes state this test as a sufficient interest test, but use
the term to denote the required quantum of interest - that quantum being a legal
right. See, e.g., Kilfco Ltd. v. Philipp Holzmann AG., 3 N.W.L.R. 276, 296G (1996);
Ogbuehi v. Governor of Imo State, 9 N.W.L.R. 53, 87B (1995); Keepler v. Ofosia, 3
N.W.L.R. 415, 429G (1995); Adeyemi v. Olakunri, 2 N.W.L.R. 500, 507H-508B
(1994); Bamidele v. Comm'r for Local Gov't, 2 N.W.L.R. 568, 583H-584A (1994);
Okafor v. Asoh, 3 N.W.L.R. 35, 55 (1999) (where the court uses the term "sufficient legal interest").
47. 7 N.W.L.R. at 639.
48. Such as any of the constitutionally guaranteed rights in Ch. IV of the
Constitution. They are the right to life, dignity of person, personal liberty, fair
hearing, private and family life, freedom of thought, conscience and religion, freedom of expression and the press, peaceful assembly and association, freedom of
movement, freedom from discrimination, the right to acquire and own immovable
property anywhere in Nigeria and protection from compulsory acquisition of property.
49. See Egolum v. Obasanjo, 7 N.W.L.R. 355 (1999); Adenekan v. Ajayi, 8
N.W.L.R. 473 (1998); Fin. Merch. Bank Ltd. v. Nig. Deposit Ins. Corp., 6 N.W.L.R.
226 (1995).
50. Such as the right to sue on a contract.
51. Oyediran v. Bolarinwa, 12 N.W.L.R. 559, 561 (1998) (any member of a
community has standing to sue in a chieftaincy matter under customary law). Cf.
Seidu v. Attorney-General of Lagos State, 2 N.W.L.R. 165 (1986).
52. 4 All N.L.R. 598 (1961).
53. R.B. Siedman, Constitutional Standards of Judicial Review of Administrative Action in Nigeria, 1 NIG. L. J. 232, 243 (1964-65).
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rights' the Court all but reads s.22(1) out of the Constitution."54 This decision, which implicitly equates "civil rights"
with "private legal rights," accounts for why the standing rule
shuts out many from the courthouse. Hence, where a public
right is infringed upon, such as a constitutional infringement
that implicates no private law right, or a public law right (an
interest recognised and protected by public law) has been violated, such as a denial of a legitimate expectation, the litigant
will be denied standing. Only private legal rights will suffice.5" This is regarded as the irreducible constitutional minimum for standing. A "real interest," "special damage," or even
"sufficient interest" (that would ordinarily have satisfied the
standing test under the AJR procedure) will therefore not
satisfy the section 6(6)(b) standing test.5"
It was certainly not the intention of the Constitution's
framers to equate "civil rights" with "private legal rights."
What was intended was that the term "civil rights" should
refer to all the justiciable matters (civil and criminal) that a
court can adjudicate. The idea was to delimit the judicial function of federal and state courts to such matters. The genus
"civil rights" therefore embraces two categories of such matters: (a) rights guaranteed in Chapter IV of the Constitution
(fundamental rights) and (b) all other justiciable matters that
can be determined by a court. The judicial power of the courts

54. Id.
55. Hence a shareholder who had sold his shares in a bank had no standing
to apply to the court to compel the regulator to revoke the license of the bank.
See Gadzama v. Rims Merch. Bank Ltd., 4 N.W.L.R. 234 (1997). Such a person,
whether or not he owned shares, had no legal right to compel the regulator to
revoke a license.
56. A person is said to have a real interest when he is "a person aggrieved" the standing requirement for certiorari. Hence, traders impugning the grant of a
licence to rivals were said to have standing under this test. See R. v. Groom, ex
parte Cobbold, 2 KB. 157 (1901). Since a real interest is an interest lower than a
private legal right, it will not suffice in Nigeria. Although there are dicta in Nigerian cases that "special damage" will confer standing, this is wrong. Clearly, "special damage" is not the same thing as "private legal right." The requirement of
"special damage" was the second alternative standing requirement for applications
for declarations and injunctions under the common law. See Boyce v. Paddington
Borough Council, 1 Ch. 109, 114 (1903). The first requirement was that of private
legal right. Cane, supra note 1, at 313 (writing that, "if [the requirement of special damage] is to have any area of operation different from that of the legal right
test it cannot refer to damage such as would entitle the plaintiff to sue for damages at common law for if he could he would have a private legal right.").
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was to extend only to a determination of matters in the two
categories. This logical view is further supported by the wording of section 36(1) of the Constitution of 1999 (i.e. section
33(1) of the Constitution of 1979)," 7 which is meant to guarantee a fair hearing, not only in relation to an adjudication involving constitutionally guaranteed rights, but also to all other
justiciable matters in respect of which a court can adjudicate." Accordingly, it should be obvious that the term "civil
rights" was intended to refer to a very wide category of matters.5 9
It is Bello J.S.C.'s interpretation of section 6(6)(b) and the
existing jurisprudence on "civil rights" that account for the
seven strange results previously identified. Consider the first
scenario. In the Merchants Bank case, it was held that a
wrongful refusal to grant a license did not infringe the civil
rights of the applicant, as a license is juridically a privilege
and not a right. 0 As the standing rule derived from section

57. NIG. CONST. § 36(1):
In the determination of his civil rights and obligations, including any
question or determination by or against any government or authority,
a person shall be entitled to a fair hearing within a reasonable time
by a court or other tribunal established by law and constituted in
such manner as to secure its independence and impartiality.
58. Clearly the term "civil rights" in § 36(1) does not refer only to a determination of constitutionally guaranteed rights (such as the right to private and family life), for if that were the case, no person will have a right to a fair hearing in
regard to an adjudication for a breach of contract, for instance. Instead, § 36(1)
gives a right to a fair hearing in respect of all justiciable matters that can come
before a court. This right to a fair hearing is a civil right, and so is the underlying justiciable matter that the litigant wishes the court to determine.
59. It is often erroneously thought that the term "civil rights" has two different meanings, to wit, constitutionally guaranteed rights (Ch. IV rights) and private
legal rights. Hence, we see Okechukwu v. Etukokwu stating that, "[a] civil right
within the meaning of section [36(1)] of the Constitution is distinct from a private
or domestic right." 8 N.W.L.R. 513, 526D (1998). The correct position is that the
term has one meaning, although it embraces two categories. The first category
covers all the Ch. IV rights and the second category covers all other justiciable
matters that can be determined by a court. Accordingly, a determination of a
justiciable matter in tort, contract or crime, for example, is one affecting the civil
rights of the person involved. Likewise is a determination of a fundamental right,
such as the right to private and family life. In respect of proceedings under these
two categories, the judicial powers of the courts are invoked because the person's
civil rights are to be determined.
60. See Nakkuda Ali v. Jayaratne, A.C. 66 (1951); Okakpu v. Resident, Pla-
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6(6)(b) fastens on civil rights, the plaintiff had no standing.6
Even though Nigerian public law recognizes that a legitimate
expectation is an interest worthy of protection62 and, therefore, the applicant for the banking license has an interest that
public law claims to protect, the standing rule prevents the
applicant from suing to protect this interest (referred to as a
public law right). This is the "court-closing" effect of the rule.
It immunizes from judicial review a substantial aspect of the
exercise of governmental power.
This is also the case where a constitutional or statutory
provision is breached without an infringement of the plaintiffs
legal rights.6 Here, only a public right has been affected. In
Douglas v. Shell Petroleum Dev. Co. Ltd.,' the Federal High
Court held that the plaintiff had no locus standi, as he showed
no prima facie evidence that his "personal right" was affected
by the failure of the defendant company to comply with the
Environmental Impact Assessment Act of 1992. It is true that
the Court of Appeals allowed the appeal against this decision
and remitted the matter back to -the Federal High Court, but
this was on the technical ground that it was erroneous to conclude that the appellant had no standing without looking at

teau Province, N.R.N.L.R. 5 (1958). As Schwartz aptly points out, "The individual
who is being given something by government to which that person has no preexisting 'right' is being given a mere 'privilege'." B. SCHWARTZ, ADMINISTRATIVE
LAW 247 (3rd ed. 1991).
61. However, if the courts come to recognize some privileges as rights, then
the plaintiff will have standing. As Schwartz points out, "[a]nother case where
yesterday's privilege has become today's right is the passport case." See SCHWARTZ,
supra note 59, at 255. This has recently occurred in Nigeria. In Agbakoba v. The
Director, S.S.S., in a powerful judgment by Ayoola J.CJAL, the Court of Appeal
transmuted this privilege into a right. 6 N.W.L.R. 475 (1994). See O.C. Okafor,
The Fundamental Right to a Passport Under Nigerian Law: An Integrated Viewpoint, 40 J. AFr. L. 53 (1996). The Supreme Court affirmed this decision on appeal. Director, S.S.S. v. Agbakoba, 3 N.W.L.R. 314 (1999). It is doubtful, however,
that this transformation of privileges into rights can be widespread, since the
transformation that occurred in the passport case was attributable to the constitutional right to freedom of movement.
62. See Stitch v. Attorney-General of the Fed'n, 5 N.W.L.R. 1007 (1986).
63. Hence, the Supreme Court, in Nwankwo v. Nwankwo, held that the provisions of the Code of Conduct set out in the Fifth Schedule to the Constitution
does not confer a civil right on any citizen for which he can sue but only the
sanction provided in paragraph 12 of the said schedule. 5 N.W.L.R. 153 (1995).
64. The decision of the Federal High Court is unreported. See Suit No.
FHC/L/CS/573/96 (Lagos Division). The Court of Appeal decision is reported. 2
N.W.L.R. 466 (1999).
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the statement of claim or in the absence of any evidence. Were
the Federal High Court to reconsider the matter, the same
result will be reached if the plaintiff fails to make a showing
that his legal rights have been violated or threatened." It
would, however, appear that in some cases of breach of statute,
nothing precludes a court from recognising a private legal right
by implying a cause of action and then using this to give the
plaintiff standing.6 6 But this highlights the circularity of the
standing rule in general: a person will have standing only if
his legal right is infringed or threatened. Yet it is the court
that would have to determine whether he has a legal right in
the first place. The court will be able to make such a determination only when its judicial powers are invoked, but those
powers cannot be invoked when no legal rights are in issue!
Strangely, the courts seem oblivious to this circular reasoning.
To make matters worse, even in private law where standing
cannot ordinarily be divorced from the merits, the courts absurdly claim that standing is not dependent on the merits of
the case. Yet, the "private legal rights" test is one that goes to
the merits."
The third strange result vividly demonstrates the injustice
that the standing rule occasions. It was the State's right to
commence and stop the prosecution of the murder suspects. If
it stopped it unconstitutionally, the deceased father's civil
rights are not affected.6 8 While it is true that there is a public
right that the criminal prosecution will not be stopped unconstitutionally, but the Nigerian standing rule, strictu sensu,
does not recognize such a right. Since the father could not

65. It makes no difference that § 7 of the Act makes provision for public involvement in the decision-making function of the environmental agency, since this
does not confer a civil right.
66. See T.I. Ogowewo, Transposition of Securities Legislation to an Emerging
Market: The Case of US Federal Securities Law and Nigeria, 11 J.I.B.L. 239 (1996)
(where it is argued that a breach of the anti-fraud provision in the securities laws
gives rise to a private cause of action).
67. For instance, standing to sue in contract cannot be determined without
ascertaining whether the plaintiff is privy to the contract sued upon. Such a determination goes to the merits. Ass'n of Data Processing Orgs. v. Camp, 397 U.S.
150, 153 (1970) (holding that "[tihe 'legal interest' test goes to the merits.").
68. The situation would be different if the father had commenced a private
prosecution, which was stopped unconstitutionally. This is because under the Criminal Procedure Law he has a legal right to commence a private prosecution. See
Fawehinmi, 4 N.W.L.R. at 797; Ogowewo, supra note 33, at 17.

544

BROOK. J. INT'L L.

[Vol. XXVI:2

point to the infringement of his private legal rights by the unconstitutional entry of the nolle prosequi, he will be denied
standing. This was how Justices Coker and Karibi-Whyte of
the Court of Appeals applied the rule in Attorney-General,
Kaduna State v. Hassan.69 It is true that on appeal their analytical application of the standing rule was brushed aside in
favor of a confused application which further complicated this
wrong law,"° but there can be no doubt that if the standing
rule is to be applied logically, there can be no escape from the
result reached by those Court of Appeal Justices.
In the fourth scenario, the petitioner in a company law
suit is denied standing because the standing test accords locus
standi only to a plaintiff "who shows that his civil rights ...
have been or are in danger of being violated or adversely affected by the act complained of." In a case of exclusion from
management, no private legal rights have been violated or
adversely affected. Indeed, if such a right were affected the
plaintiff ordinarily will be able to sue under the personal
rights exception to Foss v. Harbottle.7 ' It is for this reason
that the company's statute has created a procedure to allow
petitioners to vindicate interests that fall short of such rights.
But since the standing rule focuses on the underlying legal
right that has been infringed, the petitioner will be denied
standing. Indeed, the court will be forced to rule that the part
of Nigerian company law that allows a court to hear a petitioner even where his legal rights are not in issue is unconstitutional. The legislature cannot confer standing where the Constitution mandates otherwise. 2 The theory is that the legislature cannot confer standing in a situation that falls below the
irreducible constitutional minimum. This should occasion no

69. 5 N.C.L.R. 177 (1985). Karibi-Whyte J.C. said, "It is difficult to see how
the exercise of the power affects the civil rights and obligations of the respondentnot being a person subject to prosecution or deriving any right from such prosecution . . . The respondent has no special legal right or proprietary interest in the
prosecution of those accused of the murder of his son and their discharge from
prosecution in my view does not affect his civil rights and obligations." Id. at 203.
See id. at 194 (wherein Justice Coker made pronouncements to the same effect).
70. 2 N.W.L.R. 483 (1999). For a critique, see Ogowewo, supra note 33, at 1213.
71. 2 Hare 461 (1843).
72. "The Constitution is the fundamental law and it sets the limit of permissible actions. Consequently, a statutory grant of Locus Standi can only be valid if it
is in accord with section 6(6)(b)." See O.A. Bowen, supra note 30, at 48.
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surprise. In the U.S. Constitution, Article III also has been the
basis of the invalidation of an explicit congressional grant of
standing.7 3
The subversion of a key rationale of the standing principle
is also obvious. Instead of preventing a multiplicity of suits
and a waste of scarce judicial resources, 4 the standing rule
does precisely the opposite. This aspect of the standing rule is
highlighted in the fifth and sixth situations previously mentioned. We see that the standing rule, which has closed the
door of the courthouse to so many worthy litigants, nevertheless undermines one of the reasons for having a principle of
standing. Thus, a plaintiff whose legal rights are affected as a
result of a public nuisance can sue under this rule, and the
common law rule whereby the right of action in public nuisance - in the absence of special damage - only can be exercised by, or at the relation of, the Attorney-General will be
held to be unconstitutional. This was how the Supreme Court
decided Adediran v. Interland Transport.' This illustrates the
"court opening" effect of the rule. Furthermore, because standing to sue is linked to jurisdiction7 6 - jurisdictional questions
73. The U.S. Supreme Court has ruled unconstitutional a statutory provision
permitting, "any person [to] commence a civil suit on his own behalf (A) to enjoin
any person, including the United States and any other governmental instrumentality or agency . . . who is alleged to be in violation of any provision of this chapter." Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 572 (1992). This provision was
ruled unconstitutional because Art. III requires something more than, "a generally
available grievance about government." Id. Therefore, while it is the case, as was
stated by Tobi J.C., that a statutory right to sue abrogates a common law principle to the contrary, it is submitted that this is not the case where there is no
constitutional authority to sue, but a statute purports to permit such a suit.
Nnamani v. Nnaji, 7 N.W.L.R. 313, 330 (1999). In such a case, applying the Nigerian law of standing the courts will pronounce the statutory provision as unconstitutional. Therefore, the statement of Tobi J.C.A., in Busari v. Oseni that, "where
a statute clearly provides for the locus standi or standing of a party to sue, a
Court of law, has not option (sic) than to succumb to the provisions of such a
statute," should be qualified by adding that, for this to be so, the underlying interest in respect of which the party is given a right of action must itself be a
legal right. 4 N.W.L.R. 557, 586A (1992).
74. See Edwards v. Halliwell, 2 All E.R. 1064, 1066-67 (1950) (demonstrating
that this is a rationale for the principle of standing). See also Bentley-Stevens v.
Jones, 1 W.L.R. 638 (1974); CROMWELL, supra note 1, at 9-10.
75. 9 N.W.L.R. 155 (1991).
76. According to the Court of Appeal, a challenge to a plaintiffs locus standi
is a challenge to the jurisdiction of the court, because locus standi, "is a product
of jurisdiction." Attorney-General, Enugu State v. Avop Plc., 6 N.W.L.R. 90, 112H
(1995) (opinion of Tobi J.C.A.).
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being ones that can be raised at any stage of the proceedings the standing rule has now become a means of ambushing a
plaintiff even at the Supreme Court, although the plea of lack
of standing may never have been raised at any of the lower
courts. Who suffers? Not only the hapless plaintiff who is denied justice, but also the wider society that had to subsidize
the attempted resolution of a dispute at the expense of other
disputes.77
Finally, its constitutional provenance ensures that it overrides what the courts must now regard as "inferior" rules of
standing.7 8 Hence, even in private law, existing standing rules
are now being re-written in a manner contrary to the coherence of the substantive law in question. Apart from the inevitable doctrinal inelegance this causes, what only can be described as bad law is being produced and lawyers are now
being reared on it.
It is important to keep in view the precise formulation of
the standing rule and its test, as the solution to the problem of
standing to sue requires this. Unfortunately, the cases and text
writers do not always seem to be clear about what the standing test is. There are five reasons for the difficulty in identifying the standing test. First, this is an area where judicial confusion and ignorance are the order of the day; some judges do
not appreciate the significance of the view (to which they all
subscribe) that section 6(6)(b) is the source of the standing
rule. Hence, the courts often apply different tests under the
guise of applying the section 6(6)(b) test." It is an unfortu-

77. In Pharmatek Indus. Projects Ltd. v. Trade Bank (Nig.) Ltd., Mohammed
J.C.A. advised that an objection to the standing of the plaintiff should be raised at
an early stage of the proceedings so that it can be decided then in order to save
legal expenses and time. 7 N.W.L.R. 639, 654 (1997). See also Cent. Bank of Nig.
v. Kotoye, 3 N.W.L.R. 66, 73 (1994) (opinion of Kalgo J.C.A.). This counsel has
generally gone unheeded.
78. It has been applied in numerous legal contexts. See, e.g., Ojukwu v.
Kaine, 9 N.W.L.R. 613 (1997) (application in a probate case); Ekpan v. Uyo, 3
N.W.L.R. 63 (1986) (application in a tort case); Agbonikhena v. Egba, 2 N.W.L.R.
688 (1987) (application in a contract case); CBN v. Kotoye, 3 N.W.L.R. 66 (1994)
(application in a company law case).
79. See, e.g., Akinnubi v. Akinnubi, 2 N.W.L.R. 144, 160 (1997) (Onu J.S.C.
said, "s.6(6)(b) has been interpreted to mean that before a person could bring a
suit in respect of any subject matter, the person must show that he has a legal
right or special interest in that subject matter.").
Sometimes the courts combine different tests while purporting to apply the
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nate fact that even the Supreme Court does not always seem
to understand the precise formulation of the standing test.
This led Ademola J.C.A., in Bolaji v. Bamgbose,0 to remark
"[t]he Supreme Court has used the words 'rights being affected'
and 'interests being affected' as if the two are inter-changeable
words and mean one and the same thing. Surely, 'interest'
connotes a different thing from 'rights'." Further, he observes,
"[fWrom the review of these cases then, it does appear to me
that the courts have not been consistent in the application of
one test to the exclusion of the other. Sometimes, the adversity
of right is used where no such question has arisen.""' Clearly,
a consequence of adopting section 6(6)(b) as the basis of a universal standing rule is that the applicable test must be tied to
the language of that section. The language of the provision
uses the term "civil rights" - a term that has been interpreted

§ 6(6)(b) test. Eri J., in Damisha v. Speaker, Benue State, after stating the standing rule, "Itis only where the civil rights and obligations of a person are affected
that the Court can welcome the person" - proceeded in the next paragraph to
state, "I wish to point out that there is a distinct difference between locus standi
in an application for a declaration and locus standi as applicable to the prerogative orders." 4 N.C.L.R. 625, 631 (1983). See also Ovie-Whiskey v. Olawoyin, 6
N.C.L.R. 156, 182 (1985) (wherein Karibi-Whyte J.C.A. combines the §6(6)(b) test
with other tests.).
In Akaniwon v. Nsirim, Onalaja J.C.A. stated that, "[tihe acid test for determining locus standi was declared by the Supreme Court in Attorney General for
Kaduna State v. Hassan [citation omitted] as follows, 'There are two tests used in
determining the locus standi of a person namely (a) the action must be justiciable
and (b) there must be dispute (sic) between the parties." Nothing could be more
vacuous than this. 9 N.W.L.R. 255, 285 (1997). See also Guda v. Kitta, 12
N.W.L.R. 21, 48D-F (1999); Daramola v. A.G., Ondo State, 7 N.W.LR. 440, 476G
(2000). For more examples of the prevailing confusion, see the following cases:
Pharmatek, 7 N.W.L.R. 639, 654 (1994) (wherein Mohammed J.C.A. states that
Adesanya laid down a "a personal interest" test, but he then proceeds to state
that the relevant test is a sufficient interest test); Asheik v. Governor, Borno
State, 2 N.W.L.R. 344, 351G (1994) (wherein Muhammad J.C.A. said, "A person is
said to have locus standi if he has shown sufficient interest in the action and that
his interest has been adversely affected by the act of the defendant."). For an
exhibition of even more confusion, see the various tests referred to by Muktar
J.C.A., in Morohunfade v. Adeoti, 6 N.W.L.R. 326, 335 (1997). Uwaifo J.C.A., writing extra-judicially, states, "A party who comes to court must show that he has
sufficient interest in the subject-matter or that his allegation of an infraction of
the law adversely affects his civil rights and obligation calling for a determination
under section 6(6)(b) of the Constitution." Uwaifo J.C.A., The Court - An Instrument of Justice and Democracy, in 1995 ALL NIGERIA JUDGES' CONFERENCE PAPERS
164 (1995).
80. 4 N.W.L.R. 632, 652B (1986).
81. Id. at 653D.
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to mean "private legal rights." This means that once the section 6(6)(b) standing rule is accepted, there can be no room for
any test that does not focus on an infringement or threatened
infringement of a private legal right.
The second reason for the proliferation of tests is that the
speeches in the Adesanya case seem to contain a number of
standing tests. Judges often apply randomly any of these sundry tests with the consequence that it becomes difficult to
predict the outcome of a case.82 Hence, appeals based on locus
standi are routine, since an appellate court may use a different
test that works to the advantage of the appellant.
Third, the use of a particular test in a case may be a way
to avoid an unjust result that would ensue if the section 6(6)(b)
test were to be applied. We saw an example of this in the
Hassan case." The result of this is the addition of yet another
test to the pantheon of tests.
Fourth, courts and commentators alike have wrongly
viewed Fawehinmi v. Akilu' as broadening the law on standing. Lastly, the courts have a tendency of highlighting either
the court-opening or court-closing effect (but never both) of the
standing rule, and therefore their description of the rule can be
likened to a blindman's description of an elephant. It is for this
reason that seemingly contradictory dicta can be found in the
cases to the effect that "there is no room for the adoption of the
modern [liberall views on locus standi being followed by Eng82. Even the speech of Bello J.S.C. is sometimes used as the basis for a "sufficient interest" test. This is, however, wrong since he was merely making a general remark about the position in other common law jurisdictions. See 1 All N.L.R.
(Part 1) 1, 35 (lines 5-15).
83. 2 N.W.L.R. at 483.
84. 4 N.W.L.R. at 797.
85. See, e.g., Ebongo v. Uwemedimo, 8 N.W.L.R. 22, 45F (1995) (Adamu
J.C.A.'s decision); Nig. Airways Ltd. v. Gbajumo, 5 N.W.L.R. 735, 746B-E (1992)
(Kolawole J.C.A.'s opinion). See also Atsegbua, supra note 30, at 320. In fact, nothing of this occurred. For a fuller discussion of this case, see Ogowewo, supra note
33, at 17. However, the following comments will suffice for present purposes. First,
it is wrong to say that the § 6(6)(b) test was broadened by the statutory rule that
was in issue in the case, since a constitution can never be broadened by a statutory rule. Second, it is wrong to say that the standing test was broadened by the
Justices who decided the case, since all that occurred was the court's recognition
that a person had a right to bring a private prosecution - and this right clearly
fell within § 6(6)(b). This right is, in fact, a common law right (the right of the
common informer) and it was given statutory effect in the Criminal Procedure Law
of Lagos State. See generally Fawehinmi v. I.G.P., 7 N.W.L.R. 481 (2000).
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land and Australia,"8 6 and that Nigerian law "permits [for] a
wider and more liberal view of locus standi than the English
law ....

III. THE DISCOVERY OF A CONSTITUTIONAL
STANDING To SUE

RULE

ON

Prior to the adoption of the 1979 Constitution, there was
no universal standing rule. Locus standi depended on the
cause of action in private law and the remedy sought in public
law.' Consider a few old private law cases. In Raccah v.
Standard Company of Nigeria Ltd, 9 the plaintiffs brought an
action for the price of goods sold. The defendants argued that
they were not privy to the contract. The important point to
bear in mind is that the court focused on the cause of action,
not on an external norm. The language of privity was used
instead of a constitutional rule of locus standi. The position
was the same in tort. In Will v. Will,9" the plaintiff sued for
damages for trespass. As the statement of claim disclosed neither a right nor title to possession, and it negated any prior or
actual possession by the plaintiff, it was held that the claim
disclosed no cause of action. In Adanji v. Hunvoo,9 ' where the
court held that the particular chieftancy dispute raised no
legal claim, it was held that a cause of action had not been
made out. The point is that "[iun private law, entitlement to a
remedy and the right to apply for that remedy merge."92 The
issue of standing is simply subsumed within the cause of action.
In public law, the standing test depended on the remedy
sought. If the private law remedies of the declaration or in-

86. Thomas v. Olufosoye, 1 N.W.L.R. 669, 686D (1986) (opinion of Obaseki
J.S.C.).
87. Ovie-Whiskey v. Olawoyin, 6 N.C.L.R. 156, 191 (1985) (opinion of Akpata
J.C.A.).
88. See B.O. ILUYOMADE AND B.U. EKA, CASES AND MATERIALS ON ADMINISTRATIVE LAW IN NIGERIA 273-284 (1980); P.O.

OLUYEDE, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW IN

NIGERIA 369-375 (1992); S.I.O. AGUOLTJ, THE PREROGATIVE WRITS AND ORDERS UNDER NIGERIAN LAW AND CONSTITUTION (1981) [hereinafter AGUOLU].

89.
90.
91.
92.

4 N.L.R. 46
5 N.L.R. 74
1 N.L.R. 75
Cane, supra

(1922-1923).
(1923-1924).
(1881-1911).
note 1, at 303.
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junction were sought in a public law matter, as was the case in
Olawoyin v. Attorney-General, Northern Region, 3 and
Gamioba v. Esezi II, 9 the standing test was that applicable to
those remedies." The same was the case if the remedy applied for was one of the prerogative remedies.9 6 Again, these
cases serve to show that before the courts allowed their wrong
interpretation of section 6(6)(b) to infect public law, they decided locus standi questions not by referring to an external norm,
but instead by focusing on the remedy sought.
The position on standing in public and private law previously adumbrated was changed with the adoption in 1979 of a
Constitution, partly modeled along the lines of the U.S. Constitution
A. The Influence of Article III of the U.S. Constitution
The governmental powers of the Nigerian federation are
derived from specific provisions of the Constitution. The source
of judicial power is section 6. Section 6 is functionally similar

93. 1 All N.L.R. 269 (1961).
94. 1 All N.L.R. 584 (1961).
95. The standing tests are (a) an infringement of a legal right or (b) special
damage. See E. Kyrou, Locus Standi of Private Individuals Seeking Declaration or
Injunction at Common Law, 13 MELB. U. L. REV. 453 (1982). Although the courts
generally required an infringement of a legal right before a declaration or injunction could be granted, in the pre-Adesanya case of Olawayin v. Attorney-General,
N. Nig., the Federal Supreme Court applied a lesser test that focused on "interests" and not "rights." 1 N.L.R. 269, 273-274 (1961). However, in Gamioba v. Esezi
II, the same court changed the standard from "interests" to "rights." 1 N.L.R. 584,
588 (1961).
96. The locus standi test for certiorari was quite liberal. A real interest, as
opposed to an infringement of a legal right, sufficed. Hence, in Queen v. The Administrator, Western Nigeria, it was held that an aggrieved person had locus standi to apply for an order of certiorari ex debito justitiae. 3 W.N.L.R. 344 (1962).
The same was the case with prohibition, although there are cases to be found
where it has been held that a stranger will have locus standi. A stringent test
was required for an order of mandamus. A person had to have a legal right to
insist upon the performance of the duty in question, although modern decisions
now place emphasis on "interests." See AGUOLU, supra note 87, at 38-56; G.L.
Peiris, The Doctrine of Locus Standi in Commonwealth Administrative Law, P.L.
52 (1983).
97. See B.O. NWABUEZE, THE PRESiDENTiAL CONSTITUTION OF NIGERIA Ch. 5
(1982); B.N. Butler, The 1979 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria and
the Constitution of the United States of America: A Historical and Philosophical
Comparison, 30 HOW. L.J. 1025 (1987).
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to Article III of the Constitution of the United States, from
which the judicial powers of the federal courts emanate, with
one major difference. While Article III, section 2, is the source
of the judicial power of the federal courts (which have a limited
jurisdiction), section 6(6)(b) is the source of the judicial power
of both federal and state courts in Nigeria (which combined
have an unlimited jurisdiction). Article III, section 2, reads in
part:
The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law and
Equity, arising under this Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and Treaties made, or which shall be made, under
their Authority; - to all Cases affecting Ambassadors, other
public Ministers and Consuls; - to all Cases of admiralty and
maritime Jurisdiction; - to Controversies to which the United
States shall be a Party; - to Controversies between two or
more States; - between a State and Citizens of another State;
- between Citizens of different States; - between Citizens of

the same State claiming Lands under the Grants of different
States, and between a State, or the Citizens thereof, and
foreign States, Citizens or Subjects.98
It is clear from a reading of Article III that it "contains no
explicit constitutional requirement of 'standing'."9 9 All it does
is extend federal "Judicial Power" to certain specified "Cases"
and "Controversies." The federal courts do not decide academic
questions of law, but only such questions as arise in a "case or
controversy.""0 According to Chief Justice Warren in Flast v.
Cohen:
Embodied in the words 'cases' and 'controversies' are two
complimentary but somewhat different limitations. In part
those words limit the business of the federal courts to questions presented in an adversary context and in a form historically viewed as capable of resolution through the judicial
process. And in part those words define the role assigned to
the judiciary in a tripartite allocation of power to assure that

98. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2.
99. C.R. Sunstein, What's Standing After Lujan? Of Citizen Suits, 'Injuries,'
and Article III, 91 MICH. L. REV. 163, 168 (1992).
100. C.A. WRIGHT, LAW OF FEDERAL CoURTS 60 (5th ed. 1994).
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the federal courts will not intrude into areas committed to
the other branches of government. 1 '
The U.S. Supreme Court in Friends of the Earth, Inc v.
Laidlaw Environmental Services Inc,"°2 has pronounced that
"[tihe Constitution's case-or-controversy limitation on federal
judicial authority, Art. III, § 2, underpins both our standing
and our mootness jurisprudence." In Baker v. Carr,' the
Court had stated that the gist of the issue of standing is
whether the plaintiffs have alleged "such a personal stake in
the outcome of the controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues." In Valley
Forge ChristianCollege v. Americans United for Separation of
Church and State, Inc, °4 the Court pointed out that "[tihose
who do not possess Art. III standing may not litigate as suitors
in the courts of the United States." The test for the application
of this rule of standing, as laid down by the U.S. Supreme
Court in Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife," 5 is that the plaintiff
must make a showing that (i) it has suffered "an injury in fact"
that is (a) concrete and particularised and (b) actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical; (ii) the injury is fairly
traceable to the assailed action of the defendant; and (iii) it is
likely that the injury will be redressed by a favourable decision. It should be noted that even where the Article III requirements are satisfied, "a plaintiff may still lack standing
under the prudential principles by which the judiciary seeks to
avoid deciding questions of broad social import where no individual rights would be vindicated and to limit access to the
federal courts to those litigants best suited to assert a particular claim."10 6
The link between standing and Article III is a fairly recent
one. The link is not evident in the text of the Constitution or
record of deliberations of its framers. 7 Indeed, it has been

101. 392 U.S. 83, 94-95 (1968).

102. 120 S.Ct. 32 (1999)
103. 369 U.S. 186, 204 (1962).
104. 454 U.S. 464, 475-476 (1982). See also Dep't of Commerce v. U.S. House
of Representatives, 119 S.Ct. 765, 772 (1999); Fed. Election Comm'n. v. Akins, 118
S.Ct. 1777, 1784-87 (1998); Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env't, 118 S.Ct. 1003,
1008 (1998); Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 160-162 (1997).
105. 504 U.S. 555 (1992).
106. Gladstone Realtors v. Vill. of Bellwood, 441 U.S. 91, 99-100 (1979).
107. Sunstein, supra note 98, at 173.
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observed that "[tihe first reference to 'standing' as an Article
III limitation can be found in Stark v. Wickard, decided in
1944
[and] [tihe explosion of judicial interest in standing
as a distinct body of constitutional law is an extraordinarily recent phenomenon.""'8
From the discussion so far, three things should be evident.
First, because Article III applies only to federal courts (which
have a limited jurisdiction), a constitutional requirement of
standing derived from Article III is not as pervasive as the
standing requirement derived from section 6(6)(b), which applies to all causes in both state and federal courts. Second,
because Article III uses the term "Cases" and "Controversies,"
the test for satisfying Article III is widely formulated. The
consequence of this is that Article III is not difficult to satisfy.
This is unlike section 6(6)(b), which uses the term "civil
rights," which necessarily mandates a test tied to those words.
Hence, while the section 6(6)(b) test requires a showing of
actual or threatened violation of the plaintiffs legal rights, the
Article III test requires a showing of "injury in fact," which is
far easier to satisfy. Indeed, U.S. federal courts limit the size
of their docket mainly through their prudential rules, rather
than through Article III. Lastly, since the reading of a standing requirement into Article III was a fairly recent event, this
suggests that if it had not occurred no catastrophe would have
ensued in the U.S. federal courts. Unfortunately, none of these
points were recognised when Bello J.S.C. sought to make section 6(6)(b) do what Article III does in the United States.
Two further issues that are not so evident should be mentioned. First, Bello J.S.C. was led astray by the old jurisprudence on Article III. These cases demanded the infringement of
a legal right. This requirement was later to be swept away by
the U.S. Supreme Court in Association of Data Processing
Organizationsv. Camp,10 9 a decision to which Bello J.S.C. did
not refer. Second, Bello J.S.C. was completely oblivious of the
existence of the Federal Administrative Procedure Act which
gave standing to a person that is adversely affected by agency
action.'
This statute mitigated the harshness of the rule

108. Id. at 169.
109. 397 U.S. 150, 153 (1970)
110. See 5 U.S.C. §§ 702-703 (1994).
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that had tied standing to the requirement that the plaintiff
must have suffered a legal wrong.
B. The Adesanya Case
When the argument that section 6(6)(b) laid down a rule of
standing was initially raised, it was rejected by one state High
Court in Isagba v. Alegbe"' and by the Court of Appeal in
Bendel State v. Obayuwana." But the argument was later to
resurface in the Court of Appeal in the Adesanya case. It
would be a work of supererogation to discuss the numerous
defects that characterise the speeches in the Supreme Court,
since this has been done elsewhere.' It will suffice for present purposes to review the facts and explore the reasonings
behind the decision with a view to determining whether or not
the Supreme Court indeed decided that section 6(6)(b) contained a rule of standing to sue.
Like most famous cases that are often cited but rarely
read, the Adesanya case has not been very well analysed. This
shall now be remedied. The facts of the case lie in a small
compass. Senator Adesanya instituted proceedings in the High
Court against the President of Nigeria and his appointee to the
office of the Chairman of the Federal Electoral Commission.
He sought a declaration that the appointment was unconstitutional, and an injunction preventing it from taking effect. The
plaintiff had opposed the appointment during the confirmation
proceedings in the Senate, maintaining that it was contrary to
certain provisions of the Constitution, and was, therefore,
invalid. The majority in the Senate, however, proceeded to
confirm the appointment. The trial judge granted the declaration sought by the plaintiff and set aside the said appointment.
In the course of his judgement, the judge remarked that the
plaintiff was raising a constitutional issue that did not affect
him personally. When the defendant appealed to the Court of
Appeal, it was this observation that prompted the Court of to
raise the locus standi point suo motu."' The Court called up-

111.
112.
113.
114.

2 N.C.L.R. 424, 433 (1981).
3 N.C.L.R. 206, 210 (1982).
See Ogowewo, supra note 33.
Adesanya, 2 All N.L.R. (Part 1) 1, 8 (1981).
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on counsel to address it on the relevance of section 6(6)(b) to
the issue of standing. After making his submissions, counsel
for the plaintiff invoked the provisions of section 259(3) of the
Constitution, under which the matter could be referred to the
Supreme Court for interpretation. Although the reference was
made, the Court of Appeal nevertheless went ahead to determine the meaning of section 6(6)(b) and ruled that the plaintiff
lacked standing.'15
The Supreme Court pointed out that the approach of the
Court of Appeal in regard to the reference was wrong. According to the Chief Justice of Nigeria, Fatayi-Williams C.J.N., "A
decision already made by the Federal Court of Appeal cannot
be referred to the Supreme Court for another decision under
that section."" 6 Because of this irregularity, the reference
was deemed to be an appeal by the plaintiff against the ruling
of the Court of Appeal. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal and unanimously held that the plaintiff lacked standing.
Since the Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the Court of
Appeal, it is important to refer to that decision when examining the speeches in the Supreme Court. This is what the Court
of Appeal said about section 6(6)(b):
Section 6(6)(b) of the Constitution of 1979 contains the expression of the scope and amplitude of the judicial powers
vested in the courts. It indicates the parties and also the
subject matter which are justiciable... For a person to have
a justiciable and enforceable right, there must exist in the
person against whom the right is being enforced a legal duty
to do something in relation to which the right was being
claimed... It is not sufficient if the right to enforce any duty
is enjoyed along with every other citizen, such as a public
right or that there is a moral obligation on the part of the
other to do what was being claimed. The right to enforce the
civil rights and obligations must belong to the party so claiming to enforce it. In our opinion the expression civil right and
obligations pertain to the sphere of private rights and obligations of the citizen such as legal relationship (sic) created by
normal social and commercial interaction between citizens,
and between citizens and the State such as contracts and
torts arising therefrom." 7
115. Id. at 13-24.
116. Adesanya, 1 All N.L.R. (Part 1) 1, 15.
117. 2 All N.L.R. (Part 1) 1, 18-19 (1981). It was a joint judgement signed by
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In unanimously holding that the plaintiff lacked standing, the
Supreme Court clearly affirmed the decision of the Court of
Appeal. But was the Court of Appeal's construction of section
6(6)(b) also affirmed? This is an important question because
the source of the problem of standing to sue is Bello J.S.C.'s
affirmation of the Court of Appeal's decision that section
6(6)(b) contains a requirement of standing. It is important to
keep this in view always. The tendency has been to focus on
the conclusion that the plaintiff lacked standing rather than on
the reasoning that made such a r'uling possible. Once it is recalled that all the problems identified at the beginning of this
article stem from the assumed constitutional requirement of
standing, then analysis should be focused on aspects of the
Adesanya case that dealt with section 6(6)(b)."' Accordingly,
the relevant question is whether the view of Bello J.S.C. that
section 6(6)(b) contained a requirement of standing was accepted by a majority of the Supreme Court Justices in Adesanya.
In answering this question, we must always keep in mind
exactly what each Justice of the Supreme Court said - directly
or inferentially - on the effect of section 6(6)(b) on the principle
of standing. Putting it at its highest, there are four possible
views on the effect of section 6(6)(b), to wit: (a) it has no effect
whatsoever on standing;11 9 (b) it contains a requirement of
standing in constitutional matters only;.2 ° (c) it contains a
general requirement of standing; 1 and (d) it creates an actio
popularis (i.e. it removes the need to show standing) in constitutional matters (outside Chapter IV of the Constitution which
guarantees fundamental rights).'22 Since proposition (c) is the

Nasir, Kazeem, Ete, Nnaemeka-Agu, and Karibi-Whyte J.J.C.A.
118. What has prevented proper analysis of this case is the tendency of writers
and judges to focus on irrelevant issues. See, e.g., G. Fawehinmi, supra note 30, at
vi (wherein he purports to identify "the radicalist view," the "strict constructionist
view," and the "liberalist view," in the Adesanya case). Subsequent writers have
latched on to this categorisation. The correct approach is to focus on whether a
majority of the Justices were in favour of the view that § 6(6)(b) laid down a rule
of standing. If they were not, then the § 6(6)(b) rule and test fails. And if that is
so, the way would have been paved for the courts to apply sensible rules of
standing.
119. This is the view of this writer.
120. See Bolaji v, Bamgbose, 4 N.W.L.R. 632, 652F (1986) (opinion of Ademola
J.C.A-)
121. As stated earlier, this was the view of Bello J.S.C, in the Adesanya case.
122. As stated earlier, this was the view of the C.J.N., in the Adesanya case.
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prevailing view and it is what has been responsible for the
problems in the area, we must ask whether that proposition
received the support of a majority of the Supreme Court judges
in the Adesanya case.
Consider the lead judgement of the C.J.N. and that of
Bello J.S.C. on the question. The C.J.N. was of the view that
there was an actio populariswhere there was a constitutional
transgression outside Chapter IV of the Constitution" - although his conclusion that the Senator had no standing is at
odds with this"M - and section 6(6)(b) was what allowed for
this actio popularis. So we immediately see that his Lordship
saw a link between section 6(6)(b) and standing. But what was
the nature of the link that he saw? It was that he viewed section 6(6)(b) as playing a negative role - it dispensed with a
standing requirement in those constitutional matters. In other
words, he did not view section 6(6)(b) as laying down a locus
standi requirement. On the other hand, Bello J.S.C. construed
section 6(6)(b) as playing a positive role - it imposed a requirement of standing in all suits (constitutional and non-constitutional). Thus, while it is true that the C.J.N. and Bello J.S.C.
both saw a link between section 6(6)(b) and standing to sue,
the link that they each saw was different. One should hasten
to point out that it is the view of this writer that section
6(6)(b) plays no role on the question of standing to sue and to
the extent that the C.J.N. and Bello J.S.C. respectively attributed a negative and positive role to it, they were both wrong. It
shall be demonstrated below that neither view of the Justices
received the support of a majority of the court. Perhaps owing
to the common conclusion reached in the case, subsequent
Supreme Court cases saw Adesanya as deciding that section
6(6)(b) imposed a requirement of standing. Since it is the thesis of this article that the problems in this area stem from this
singular fact, it is imperative that we examine whether the
Adesanya case actually laid down the proposition now attributed to it. If by a majority the remaining Justices were in favour
of Bello J.S.C.'s view, then it will be correct to say that
Adesanya decided that section 6(6)(b) laid down a rule of

123. 1 All N.L.R. (Part 1) at 20-21.
124. His conclusion generates a permanent sense of incredulity. For a critique,
see Ogowewo, supra note 33, at 7-8.
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standing.
A close reading of the case will show that only Idigbe
J.S.C."2 and Nnamani J.S.C.'26 agreed with Bello J.S.C.'s
construction of section 6(6)(b). It has always been wrongly
thought that Uwais J.S.C. agreed with the construction placed
on section 6(6)(b) by Bello J.S.C.'27 Uwais J.S.C. said, "I feel
that the interpretation to be given to section 6 subsection (6)(b)
of the Constitution will depend on the facts or special circumstances of each case. So that no hard and fast rule can really
be set-up."" 8 Leaving aside this strange interpretation method," the important point that results from this is that we
cannot in all seriousness treat Uwais J.S.C. as deciding that
section 6(6)(b) lays down a rule of standing. It is noteworthy
also that Sowemimo J.S.C."' and Obaseki J.S.C. 3 ' both did
not agree with the view of Bello J.S.C. that section 6(6)(b)
contained a requirement of standing. Hence, if we ask the
question whether the Supreme Court by a majority decided
that section 6(6)(b) imposes a standing requirement, only a

125. 1 All N.L.R. (Part 1) at 39.
126. Id. at 51.
127. Perhaps because Uwais J.S.C. commenced his judgement thus, "I have had
the opportunity of reading in draft the judgement read by my learned brother the
Chief Justice of Nigeria. I agree with the reasons and conclusions therein except, I
regret, as to the interpretation to be given to § 6(6)(b) of the Constitution of Nigeria, 1979." Id. at 56. But this does not suggest that he was agreeing with Bello
J.S.C.'s construction. Recall that there are four possible constructions of § 6(6)(b).
Bello J.S.C. and the C.J.N. each subscribed to two different interpretations, none
of with which Uwais J.S.C.'s explicitly agreed.
128. Id. at 56-57.
129. The beguiling nature of this approach to statutory construction surprisingly has not been recognized. See Ozekhome, supra note 30, at 79 (wherein the
author quotes this part of the speech of Uwais J.S.C. and then states, "We respectively share his Lordship's opinion."). It has not been recognized that the logical
consequence of Uwais J.S.Cs interpretation method is that a statutory provision
can never have one meaning. Although the point .istoo plain for argument, this is
not a method that is used to interpret a provision. It is perfectly reasonable to
say that in exercising a discretion the facts of the case would have to be considered, but this is never done when construing a provision.
130. Sowemimo J.S.C. stated, "On interpretation (sic) placed on section 6(6)(b) I
prefer to reserve my comments until a direct issue really arises for a determination." 1 All N.L.R. (Part 1) at 30.
131. Obaseki J.S.C. stated, "This provision by itself, in my opinion and respectful view, does not create the need to disclose the locus standi or standing of the
plaintiff in any action before the court and imposes no restriction on access to the
courts. It is the cause of action that one has to examine to ascertain whether
there is disclosed a locus standi or standing to sue." 1 All N.L.R. (Part 1) at 50.
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negative answer can be given, since only three Justices (Bello,
Idigbe and Nnamani) out of a total number of seven saw section 6(6)(b) as having this particular effect. Therefore, it is
obvious that the Supreme Court in Adesanya did not decide
that section 6(6)(b) contains a requirement of standing. Unfortunately, this has never been recognised by the courts and
commentators. Misreading the case, they treat Bello J.S.C.'s
rule as the principle of the case. la2 The views of those - a
group wrongly identified as the minority - who did not agree
with this particular construction of section 6(6)(b) are treated
as obiter.133 The reason for this is obvious. The courts and
commentators have focussed on the false choice between the
C.J.N.'s actio popularis and Bello J.S.C.'s standing rule, as
opposed to the relevant issue of whether or not a majority of
the Adesanya court read section 6(6)(b) as laying down a requirement of standing. If attention had been focussed on the
latter, it would have been realised that on this issue the
Adesanya case contains no ratio. This assertion may at first
appear baffling. But there are cases where there is a plurality
of speeches and no ratio can be discerned. In such cases, the
decision is only an authority for what it actually decides. According to Sir Rupert Cross:
[Tihe most frequent instances of cases which are only authority for what they actually decide are those in which five
speeches are delivered in the House of Lords. There is of
course no question of any want or obscurity of reasoning,
there is simply nothing which can be described as the ratio
decidendi of the House."3 . . . Where there is no majority in
132. Uwais J.S.C. said, "[tihe locus classicus on locus standi is the decision of

this Court in Adesanya v. President of Nigeria [citation omitted] which was based
"
on the interpretation of section 6 subsection (6)(b) of the Constitution ....
Briefly, the Adesanya case laid down the principle that a plaintiff will have locus
standi once he can show that his "civil rights and obligations" have been, are
being, or are about to be, violated." Fawehinmi v. Akilu, 4 N.W.L.R. 797, 858A-C
(1987). In Odeneye v. Efunuga, Nnaemeka-Agu J.C.A. said, "[now, the question of
locus standi to institute an action has fortunately been spelt out and delimited by
our written Constitution of 1979 - Section 6(6)(b)." 7 N.W.L.R. at 641H.
133. In Anago-Amanze v. Onwudiwe, Araka C.J. so misreads the case that he
states as follows, "The majority decision of Sowemimo J.S.C., Bello J.S.C., Idigbe
J.S.C., Obaseki J.S.C., Uwais J.S.C., and Nnamani J.S.C., is now binding on this
Court and all Courts in Nigeria." 6 N.C.L.R. 620, 632 (1985). See Ngibo v. Ateze,
5 N.C.L.R. 464, 468 (1984) (wherein Eri J. described the C.J.N.'s views as obiter).
See also Damisha v. Speaker, Benue State, 4 N.C.L.R. 625 (1983).
134. See The Ratio Decidendi and a Plurality of Speeches in the House of
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favour of a particular ratio, it is difficult to escape the conclusion that a case is only authority for what it actually decides.1" . .. Where there is no ratio decidendi of the House,
lower courts are only bound by its decisions in cases in which
the circumstance are not reasonably distinguishable from
those which gave rise to the decisions.136
The assertion that Adesanya contains no ratio on the meaning
and effect of section 6(6)(b) simply means that the case is not
an authority for the proposition that section 6(6)(b) lays down
a rule of standing to sue.
IV. THE WRECKING OF NIGERIAN LAW
A wrong rule of standing took firm root after a brief period
of uncertainty'37 and grew inexorably. Beginning as an acorn
seed, it soon became an oak tree whose branches were later to
extend to every area of Nigerian law. By the time Inyangukwo
v. Akpan"3 ' was decided, Ntia J. could declare that the judicial ink expended on the rule of locus standi was such as "to
make the issue easily comprehended by any practising lawyers." In Attorney-General of Kaduna State v. Hassan,139 not
only did Bello J.S.C. maintain his construction of section
6(6)(b), his fellow brethren acquiesced in the view that this
construction represented the principle of Adesanya's case. Although the courts recognized that the crucial aspect of the
Adesanya decision was the effect of section 6(6)(b), 4 ° some
judges still did not understand the nature and ambit of the
standing rule. One only needs to consider the speeches of some
of the Justices of the Supreme Court in Attorney-General of
Kaduna State v. Hassan," and the speech of Eso J.S.C. in

Lords, 93 L.Q.R. 378, 379 (1977).
135. Id. at 380.
136. Id. at 379.
137. In Bendl State v. The Fed'n, 3 N.C.L.R. 1, 92-97 (1982), Eso J.S.C. accepted the C.J.N.'s actio popularis. See also Akinpelu v. Attorney-General, Oyo
State, 5 N.C.L.R. 557, 566 (1984) (opinion of Oloko J.).
138. 6 N.C.L.R. 770, 774 (1985).
139. 2 N.W.L.R. 483, 504-505 (1985).
140. In Damisha, Eri J. said, "The constitutional provisions in the said §
6(6)(b) is, in my view, a repetition of the doctrine of locus standi." 4 N.C.L.R. 625,
631 (1983).
141. 2 N.W.L.R. 483 (1985). All the speeches of the Justices of the Supreme
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Fawehinmi v. Akilu,"' to observe this. In the latter case, Justice Eso muddied the water by pronouncing that the law on
had been broadened when no such thing had ocstanding
143
curred.

It is very doubtful that Bello J.S.C. intended to formulate
a rule of law to be applicable in all areas of Nigerian law,

bearing in mind that he was dealing with a narrow constitutional question and that his commentary on the rule of standing which he "discovered" occupied just three-quarters of a

page in a judgement that occupied nine pages of the All Nigerian Law Reports.'" This can be contrasted with the fuller
statement of the rule by the Court of Appeal. However, it was
inevitable that once the rule was accepted as the principle of
Adesanya's case, it had to be applied in all areas of Nigerian
law. There are three reasons for its pervasiveness. First, the
provision underpinning it is a constitutional provision and as
such it is supreme to all laws; second, the text of the underpinning provision is general, i.e., it does not suggest that it is limited to constitutional law. 45 Thirdly, unlike Article III of the
U.S. Constitution, it applies to federal and state courts.
The first case that demonstrated that the standing rule
Court (with the exception of that of Bello J.S.C.) showed clearly that they did not
understand the test that they were applying. One clear example is provided by the
speech written by Irikefe J.S.C., where he stated that § 213(5) of the 1979 Constitution gave the father standing to sue. See id. at 496C. Aniagolu J.S.C. concurred in this opinion. See id. at 511. For a critique of this, see Ogowewo, supra
note 33, at 13. For a decision showing the absurdity of Irikefe J.S.C.'s position,
see Ifebuzor v. Nwabeze, 8 N.W.L.R. 148, 162C (1998).
142. 4 N.W.L.R. at 847.
143. Id.
144. It is seldom recognized that what Bello J.S.C. "discovered" was what the
Court of Appeal had already discovered. It is telling that Bello J.S.C. said very
little on this provision in the Adesanya case. In Adesanya, he began his judgement
thus, "The main question for determination on the appeal is a narrow one. It is
whether or not a Senator as such or in his capacity as a citizen has locus standi
to challenge the constitutionality of an appointment made by the President and
confirmed by the Senate in accordance with the provisions of section 141(1) of the
Constitution." 1 All N.L.R. (Part 1) at 31. He then stated that, "the question of
standing ought to be decided on the very narrow compass it has been canvassed
before us." Id. at 32-33.
145. The C.J.N., in Adesanya, was of the view that it was limited to constitutional litigation (hence his actio popularis was limited to this). But surely there is
nothing in the provision that indicates that it has anything to do with standing to
sue generally or standing to sue in constitutional matters. See Ogowewo, supra
note 33, at 7.
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was applicable outside constitutional matters was Thomas v.
Olufosoye.'46 The embarrassing aspect of this case was that it
confirmed the suspicion that even the Supreme Court did not
fully understand its wrong standing rule. Purporting to apply
the section 6(6)(b) test in a private law matter, what the court
in fact did, was to apply a test of standing drawn from public
law. Recall that in private law cases, courts deal with what is
conceptually a locus standi issue by simply asking whether
there is a cause of action. Hence in a contract dispute the common law teaches that privity rules tell us who has the legal
right to sue on a contract.'47 Now, if we distort matters in the
way that the Nigerian courts have done by applying the section
6(6)(b) test to this private law issue, the same result will ensue. This is because under this test a plaintiff will be allowed
to sue if his civil rights are in issue and "civil rights" have
been construed to mean private legal rights. Indeed, the Court
of Appeal has pointed out in Bamidele v. Commissioner for
Local Government,4 s that, "[elvery right founded on contract
is a private right." Hence, the constitutional test of standing
(by focusing on private legal rights) will not upset what are
conceptually standing rules in private law; they will both produce the same results, although there will be the obvious doctrinal inelegance of invoking the constitution in contract
law.'49 But if the section 6(6)(b) test is applied wrongly (as

146. 1 N.W.L.R. 669 (1986).
147. Hence, in Natl Union of Hotels and Personal Serus. Union v. Imo
Concorde Hotels Ltd., Edozie J.C.A., said, "[i]t is an elementary principle of law
which requires no citation that, generally, only a party to a contract may sue on
it. The appellants action was not properly constituted as the appellant had no
locus standi to maintain it since there was no privity of contract between it and
the respondent in respect of contracts of employment between the respondent and
its workers whose employment were terminated." 1 N.W.L.R. 306, 327 (1994). The
U.K. Parliament has recently passed the Contracts (Right of Third Parties) Act,
1999 to make provision for the enforcement of contractual terms by third parties
in certain defined circumstances.
148. 2 N.W.L.R. 568, 583G (1994).
149. A recent example of this doctrinal inelegance in trespass is Yusuf v.
Akindipe, 8 N.W.L.R. 376, 385H (2000). Apart from this doctrinal inelegance, Nigerian courts have managed to create another problem for themselves. It will be
recalled that it was pointed out that in private law, what is conceptually a locus
standi issue is subsumed within the cause of action. It is, however, common to
find Nigerian courts dealing with the issue of locus standi and the issue of
whether there is a cause of action as if they are separate issues. See Adesokan v.
Adegorolu, 3 N.W.L.R. 261, 278-299 (1997); N.N.B. Ltd. v. Odiase, 8 N.W.L.R. 235,
244 (1993).
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5 ), it will embarrass
was the case in Thomas v. Olufosoye"'
private law. Let us now consider the facts of the case.
The plaintiffs were communicants of the Anglican Communion within the Diocese of Lagos. They challenged the appointment of Reverend Adetiloye as the new Bishop of Lagos and
asked the court to declare it void because the process of the
appointment contravened the rules of the church. Apart from
their membership of the church, they adduced no other interest
in the matter. The defense argued that the plaintiffs had no
locus standi because their civil rights were not affected by the
wrongful appointment. The Supreme Court accepted this argument. Obaseki J.S.C., who, in Adesanya did not see section
6(6)(b) as laying down a rule of standing applicable in all areas
of the law,151 did a complete somersault without explaining
his reason for such a change. In applying the standing rule
derived from section 6(6)(b), Obaseki J.S.C. said, "I have
searched in vain to discover any question as to the civil rights
and obligations of the plaintiffs raised in the statement of
claim," and concluded, "I cannot say that the plaintiffs/appellants have on the pleadings disclosed any 'locus

If we purport to make them separate, we will introduce significant problems. One such problem is this: If the court concludes that there is no cause of
action, the appropriate order is to dismiss the case; but if the court says that
there is no standing, we find the court saying that the case should be struck out.
See Adesokan v. Adetunji, 5 N.W.L.R. 540 (1994). At the root of this confusion is
the application of one rule of standing in public and private law. The true view is
that in public law, standing is a separate jurisdictional issue that does not go to
the merits; while in private law standing cannot be divorced from the merits. But
once this distinction is swept away by the application of a single standing rule,
then the above problem logically follows.
150. 1 N.W.L.R. 669 (1986).
151. Indeed, in agreeing with the judgement of the C.J.N., in the Adesanya
case, Obaseki J.S.C. said, "it wholly accords with my thinking on this matter." 1
All N.L.R. (Part 1) at 42. Further, he noted that, "I agree totally with the reasons
for dismissing the appeal set out in the judgement of my learned brother, FatayiWilliams, C.J.N." Id. at 50. The C.J.N. had said - and we must assume that
Obaseki J.S.C. was agreeing with this - "incases where a plaintiff seeks to establish a 'private right' or 'special damage', either under the common law or administrative law, in non-constitutional litigation, by way of an application for certiorari,
prohibition, or mandamus for a declaratory and injunctive relief, the law is now
well settled that the plaintiff will have locus standi in the matter only if he has a
special legal right or alternatively, if he has sufficient or special interest in the
performance of the duty sought to be enforced, or where his interest is adversely
affected." Id. at 26. So we see from this that Obaseki J.S.C. agreed with the
C.J.N. that § 6(6)(b) does not contain a standing requirement.
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standi'."1 2 But did the court apply the section 6(6)(b) test logically? In purporting to apply the section 6(6)(b) test, the court
required the plaintiff (in a private law matter) to show some
higher interest other than membership of the Anglican Communion. 5 ' Put simply, the court sought to apply in a private
law context a test that is applicable only where public rights
are in issue. This was a misplaced application of a public law
test (which the Supreme Court had debarred itself from applying even in public law matters) in a private law setting. 154
The Communion was an unincorporated body that had carefully drawn out rules. Such bodies are generally treated as having a contractual juridical basis.'55 A breach of those rules
was an infringement of the contractual rights of its members.
A member, therefore, had a legal right to insist on compliance
with its rules.'5 6 Clearly, if the court had applied its section
6(6)(b) test logically, the plaintiff would have had standing.157

152. Thomas v. Olufosoye, 1 N.W.L.R. at 683A, 686C (1986).
153. "The question that naturally comes to my mind is: Is it enough for the
plaintiffs/appellants to state that they are all communicants of the Anglican Communion? Have they not got to say that they have an interest in the office of the
Bishop?" Id. at 686B.
154. Eso J.S.C. added to the confusion by delivering a judgement that may
have given the impression that he was of the view that the dispute was not justiciable. He said, "[wihat is very important in the case is the danger of bringing
Religion as such to the reasoning of jurisprudence (sic)." Id. at 687B. Lapsing into
Old English, as if a case on religion calls for this, he says, "[tlhe reasoning in
religion is one of God or Allah which passeth all jurisprudential understanding."
Id. But surely, the case raised no religious doctrinal issue. The plaintiffs were
simply arguing that the rules of the church had been breached. If Eso J.S.C.'s
reasoning is to be followed, then the court will not interfere when its bishop has
wrongfully dissipated the assets of the church!
155. See T.I. Ogowewo, Is Contract the Juridical Basis of the Takeover Panel?,
12 J.I.B.L. 15 (1997). However, it does not always follow that the existence of a
constitution necessarily leads to the conclusion that there is a contract. For there
to be a contract, the court should be satisfied that there was an intention to create legal relations. Where there is no such intention, the action should be dismissed because the cause of action has not been made out. Many of the so-called
church cases that involve matters of doctrine fall under this head.
156. "Every right founded on contract is a private right." Bamidele v. Comm'n
for Local Gov't, 2 N.W.L.R. 568, 583G (1994).
157. It must be said that Oputa J.S.C. did agree that where there is a contract the courts will intervene to protect the contractual rights of the parties.
Thomas, 1 N.W.L.R. at 688-693. He, however, was of the view that there was no
contract, since the terms of the contract were not pleaded. He, therefore, held that
since there were no legal rights in issue, the judicial powers of the courts could
not be invoked. Id. But this is mistaken. The terms of the contract were contained
in the constitution of the Diocese - which was pleaded.
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The wrecking of contract law continued. In "K" Line Inc. v.
KR. Int. (ig) Ltd.,5 ' we see Tobi J.C.A. stating a number of
tests, none of which were relevant to the issue at hand, which
he considered should guide him in determining whether a consignee could sue on a bill of lading where there was non-delivery of the shipped goods. The issue of who can sue where there
has been non-delivery by a carrier should be decided by reference to whether a cause of action has been established in tort
(if property has passed to the consignee) or contract (if there is
privity to the contract evidenced in the bill of lading).'59 We
see the same confusion in another contract case: N.N.B. Ltd. v.
Odiase.6 ° Here, a person sued a bank for breach of contract
and the issue was whether there was a cause of action. This
turned on whether there was a banker-customer relationship.
The court failed to appreciate that the issue of whether there
was a cause of action was conceptually the same question as
whether the plaintiff had locus standi. So the court, having
concluded that there was a banker-customer relationship, bizarrely went on to examine the issue of locus standi!'6 ' This
shows the mess in which the courts have found themselves.
The issue of locus standi had already been dealt with when the
court held that there was a cause of action for breach of the
banker-customer relationship.
The rule of standing continued with its destructive streak.
In Taiwo v. Adegboro,'6 2 we see it infiltrate property law.
Here, the respondent was in occupation of a house that was
sold by a bank pursuant to its security; the security having
been granted by the owner of the house who was now deceased. The respondent challenged the sale effected by the

158. 5 N.W.L.R. 159 (1993). At 176D, Tobi J.C.A. stated, "The state of the law
is that before a person could be said to have locus standi in a matter, he must
show that he has sufficient interest which is enforceable in law and not one that
he shares with other members of the society." At 176G, his Lordship states, "One
test of sufficient interest is whether the plaintiff who instituted the action could
have been joined as a party to the suit if some other party commenced the action.
Another test is whether the plaintiff seeking the redress or remedy will suffer
some injury or hardship arising from the litigation if some other person instituted
it. I shall be guided by the above tests in the determination of the standing of
K.R. in this matter."
159. See Broadline Enter. v. Monterey Mar. Corp., 9 N.W.L.R. 1 (1995).
160. 8 N.W.L.R. 235, 244 (1993).
161. Id.
162. 11 N.W.L.R. 224 (1997).
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mortgagee, and the question of her standing was raised. Mohammed J.C.A. promptly invoked section 6(6)(b). In doing so,
he inflicted severe damage on that part of property law. This is
because, without ascertaining the legal nature of the
respondent's interest (if any) in the property, he stated thus:
The mere fact that the 1st respondent was in possession and
occupation of the house in dispute at the time it was sold by
the 2nd and 3rd respondents to the appellant on 17/6/89, that
alone in my view was enough to have given the 1st respondent a standing to institute an action to challenge the validity of the sale."
The standing rule also made an in-road into the law of
torts. It has been said that "[a] widespread wrong, as for example a public nuisance, if individually actionable by all affected
in some way, could produce a good deal of litigation. Some of
the earliest nuisance cases recognized this and it is a reason
advanced for the special standing rule that developed in those
cases."" This rule has now been demolished by the Nigerian
standing rule. In Adediran v. Interland Transport Ltd., 65 the
plaintiffs action in public nuisance was objected to by the defendants on the ground that in the absence of proof of special
damage, the Attorney General should have sued or permitted a
relator action to be brought. Karibi-Whyte J.S.C. pronounced:
The Constitution has vested the Courts with the powers for
the determination of any question as to the civil rights and
obligations between government or authority and any person
in Nigeria ... Accordingly, where the determination of the
civil rights and obligations of a person is in issue, any law
which imposes conditions, is inconsistent with the free and
unrestrained exercise of that right, is void to the extent of
such inconsistency. Thus the restriction imposed at common
law on the right of action in public nuisance is inconsistent
with the provisions of section 6(6)(b) of the Constitution, 1979
and to that extent is void. 16
"The judicial activism of the Supreme Court judges is laud-

163. Id. at 234.
164. CROMWELL, supra note 1, at 178.

165. 9 N.W.L.R. 155 (1991).
166. Id. at 180.
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able."'67 This was how a Nigerian academic welcomed this
decision - without appreciating that the natural consequence
of allowing a million plaintiffs to sue individually in respect of
a public nuisance, is that the courts would be overwhelmed
and inevitably it would be impossible to do justice for them. It
should be noted that the court did not impose a requirement
that such actions should be brought by means of a class action.
It is interesting to note that even in the United States a member of the public who suffers harm as a result of a public nuisance will have a right of action for damages only where he
has "suffered harm of a kind different from that suffered by
other members of the public exercising the right common to
the general public that was the subject of the interference."16 8
The seeds for the Adediran decision were, in fact, sown in the
Adesanya case. It will be recalled that the C.J.N. was of the
view that section 6(6)(b) was relevant to locus standi in constitutional litigation. He saw the provision as removing any
standing requirement where there was a constitutional violation outside a breach of Chapter IV. This actio popularisview
was rejected in later cases, but the seed had already been sown
for the idea that section 6(6)(b) could have the effect of opening
the courts. What the courts later did was to effect this opening
within the context of Bello J.S.C.'s test. Hence, the view became established that once a person's civil rights were violated
or threatened, the person had standing and no statutory or
common law rule could prevent this. It was Akpata J.C.A. in
Ovie-Whiskey v. Olawoyin 69 (six years before the Adediran

167. I.P. Enemo, The Tort of Nuisance and the Nigerian Oil Industry, NIG.
JUD. REV. 195, 202 (1994-97); F.C. Nwoke, The Changing Face of Public Nuisance
in Nigeria, 4 U. Jos. L. J. 108, 118 (1994) (describing the decision as "a welcome
development"). See also J.G. Frynas, Legal Change in Africa: Evidence from OilRelated Litigation in Nigeria, 43 J.A.L. 121, 134-136 (1999). The Adediran decision
has been welcomed mainly because there has been a history of inefficient Attorneys-General neglecting to sue or refusing to permit a relator action to be brought
in cases of public nuisance. However, modifying the cause of action to permit
universal individual suits is not the solution to this problem, since this would
introduce the further problem of overloading the courts. The patch will be worse
than the hole. A sensible solution would have been to impose personal liability on
the holder of the office of Attorney-General, where there has been a clear case of
nonfeasance.
168. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 821C (1979). See also Burns Jackson
v. Lindner, 59 N.Y.2d 314, 464 N.Y.S.2d 712, 721, 451 N.E.2d 459, 468 (1983);
Bologna v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 95 F. Supp. 2d 197 (S.D.N.Y. 2000).
169. Ovie-Whiskey v. Olawoyin, 6 N.C.L.R. 156, 191-192 (1985).
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case) who, in fact, sounded the deathknell of the standing rule
in public nuisance; the Supreme Court in Adediran was merely
the rule's hangman. 7 '
The judicial vandalism continued. This time it was the
turn of company law. In 1993 the Supreme Court ruled in
Elufioye v. Halilu'7 ' that the section 6(6)(b) standing rule
would override the rule in Foss v. Harbottle."' Omo J.S.C.
proclaimed:
Once the civil rights and obligations of the plaintiffs as individuals are affected ...the courts in exercise of their judicial
power [under section 6(6)(b)] can look into such rights and
obligations, and for that purpose the plaintiffs have a locus
standi before them. Such right guaranteed under the Constitution cannot be in any way detrimentally affected by the

common law rule in Foss v. Harbottle.'73
Superficially, this statement may not seem to herald a
disaster for company law, since it is difficult to envisage how
the constitutional test will be broader than the personal rights
exception to the rule in Foss v. Harbottle. 4 As standing under the constitutional test is defined in terms of a breach of a
person's legal right, it follows that there would be no conflict
between the personal rights exception to Foss v. Harbottle and
the constitutional test. Indeed, Karibi-Whyte J.S.C. recognized
this much in the case at hand when he said that the rule in
Foss v. Harbottle is "ad idem with section 6(6)(b) of the Constitution 1979 where there is locus standi if the determination of
the civil rights and obligations of the plaintiff is involved."17
However, quite apart from the obvious awkwardness of
conducting the constitution into the contractual relationship of
corporators, lurking beneath this veneer of congruence is the
170. It is astonishing that in a subsequent case the Supreme Court restated
the traditional view without referring to the Adediran case. See Daodu v.
N.N.P.C., 2 N.W.L.R. 355 (1998). Is one to take it that the Supreme Court was
not even aware of its own previous decision in Adediran? See also Ilori v. Benson,
9 N.W.L.R. 570, 578E & 579D (2000).
171. 6 N.W.L.R. 570, 595D (1993).

172. 2 Hare 461 (1843).
173. 6 N.W.L.R. 570, 595D (1993).
174. It is a misnomer to refer to the personal rights category as an exception
to the rule in Foss, since the rule cannot apply to debar a member from suing
when the member's personal rights have been infringed.
175. Elufioye, 6 N.W.L.R. at 599E.

20001

WRECIUNG THE LAW

569

potential for disaster. This is because where the courts wrongly
identify a "right" (perhaps because the plaintiff alleges a right
and the substantive law is not clear to them) and this "right"
cannot be litigated because of the rule in Foss v. Harbottle, it
is likely that the courts will hold that this "right" should be redressed by virtue of section 6(6)(b) and that the rule in Foss v.
Harbottle should give way. Indeed, the Supreme Court has said
as much. Omo J.S.C. said:
It is only where the right and obligations of an individual are
in issue, and such a case does not fit into the exceptions
under the rule in Foss v. Harbottle,that there may be a conflict since locus standi is available to the individual in a
determination of his rights and obligations.176
A case where this is possible is one where errant directors loot
the corporate treasury, resulting in the diminution of the company's share price. It is conceivable that a shareholder may
point to the fall in the value of the shares in his pocket caused
by the wrongdoing, and that the court may see this "loss" as
giving rise to a personal right to sue. Since the rule in Foss v.
Harbottle prevents a shareholder from obtaining personal recovery in respect of such "loss,"'77 it is likely that a Nigerian
court will grant the shareholder standing because of section
6(6)(b), once it wrongly identifies an infringed "right."78 At
once, by so doing, the courts would have chipped off one of the
central features of company law - the principle of separate corporate personality - and introduced the spectre of double recovery. A harbinger of this is the recent Court of Appeal decision
in Central Bank of Nigeria v. Kotoye.'79 In that case, it was
stated emphatically that: "the rule in Foss v. Harbottle is a
common law rule derived from the decisions of courts. It has
no legal force or effect and can be overridden by statute ...

176. Id. at 595E.
177. A shareholder has no personal action for a diminution in the value of his
shares caused by directorial wrongdoing. See Stein v. Blake, 1 All E.R. 724 (1998).
See also T.I. Ogowewo, Personal Actions for a Diminution in the Value of Shares,
9 K.C.L.J. 150 (1998-99).
178. It is hoped that if this occurs, the courts will recognize that the wrong
has been committed against the company and therefore the company is the proper
plaintiff. See Gombe v. P.W. (Nig.) Ltd., 6 N.W.L.R. 402, 420B (1995).
179. 3 N.W.L.R. 66, 73 (1994).
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[o]nce the question of the civil rights and obligations of the
plaintiff/respondents as an individual is affected or likely to be
affected, under section 6(6)(b) of the 1979 Constitution, an
individual is entitled to invoke the judicial powers of the Constitution . . .in this case, the rule in Foss v. Harbottle will
have to give way to such individual rights and obligations
which were about to be encroached." 8 '
This point goes well beyond company law. Whenever the
courts stumble upon any rule of law, substantive or procedural,
that regulates access to the courts or entitlement to legal relief, there is always a risk that such a rule would be held to be
unconstitutional on the ground that it is inconsistent with
section 6(6)(b). An example of such a substantive rule is the
rule restricting recovery for pure economic loss in negligence.
The destructive effect of this standing rule on Nigerian substantive and procedural law cannot be underestimated.18 1 Instead of the courts re-thinking their rule they have persisted in
applying it often with supreme arrogance borne out of profound ignorance. It was Oputa J.S.C. who said in Oredoyin v.

180. Id. at 77D, 80E-F.
181. Consider a case where a consignee who is not a party to the bill of lading
contract attempts to sue the carrier for damage caused to the delivered goods and
property had not passed before the damage occurred because the goods were part
of a larger bulk and were therefore unascertained. If the consignee sues in contract the action should fail because there is an absence of privity and if he sues
in tort the action will fail because he did not have property at the time of the
damage. Although, there have always been ways to allow the consignee to sue
(e.g. such as implying a Brandt v. Liverpool contract, assignment of contractual
rights, and the use of the rule in Dunlop v. Lambert), it is likely that a Nigerian
court would simply invoke § 6(6)(b) to permit the buyer to sue. By so doing, the
courts would be re-writing Nigerian shipping law. Two challenges have been made
to procedural law on the basis of § 6(6)(b). In Atolagbe v. Awuni, a law which
made the payment of a deposit a condition precedent to the institution of an action against the government was challenged as being contrary to § 6(6)(b). On this
occasion the challenge failed at the Supreme Court. See 9 N.W.L.R. 536 (1997). In
N.N.P.C. v. Fawehinmi, a law which prescribes that a pre-action notice should be
issued before an action is brought (§ 12 Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation
Act, Cap. 320 Laws of the Federation of Nigeria) was challenged as being inconsistent with § 6(6)(b). The challenge failed at the Court of Appeal, although there
was a dissenting judgement. See 7 N.W.L.R. 598 (1998). The correct position is
that requirements that have the effect of unreasonably limiting access to the
courts can be challenged on the ground that they contravene the constitutional
provision (§ 36 of the Constitution of 1999) that guarantees a right to a fair hearing. This is how its progenitor (Art. 6 of the ECHR) has been interpreted. See R.
v Lord Chancellor, ex parte Lightfoot, B.C.C. 537 (2000). See also Amadi v.
N.N.P.C., 10 N.W.L.R. 76, 109G & 10B (2000).
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Arowolo,'8 2 "since [the Adesanya case] was decided, there
has been 'quiet murmuring' among members of the profession
as to whether or not it was too widely or too narrowly decided.
These murmuring are neither here nor there." Onalaja J.C.A.
in Ejiwunmi v. Costain (WA) Plc. has even said, "this rule of
law is also a rule of common-sense."" F.R.A. Williams, a
leading Nigerian advocate, has even gone as far as stating
that, "Nigerian legal history will endorse the view that the reasoning of Mr. Justice Bello on locus standi in civil proceedings
as contained in his judgment in Adesanya's case will turn out
to be one of his most useful and lasting contributions to Nigerian jurisprudence.""8
So far, only one judge has been able to see through this
dense fog of obfuscation. Ayoola J.C.A. in a dissenting judgement in F.A.T.B. v. Ezegbu stated thus:
I do not think section 6(6)(b) of the Constitution is relevant to
the question of locus standi. If it is we could as well remove
any mention of locus standi from our law books. Section
6(6)(b) deals with judicial powers and not with individual
rights. Locus standi deals with the rights of a party to sue. It
must be noted that standing to sue is relative to a cause of
action."
This independent and bold piece of thinking is an oasis of
common sense in a desert of sophistry. Its only shortcoming
was the absence of supporting argument that a dissenting
judgement of this sort needs. The wait for supporting argument did not, however, last long. For in 1998, in a seminal
judgement," 6 Ayoola J.C.A. was able to give a construction to

182. 4 N.W.L.R. at 186.
183. 12 N.W.L.R. at 167.
184. F.R.A. Williams, A Tribute to Justice Mohammed Bello, in THE
AUTHORISED BIOGRAPHY OF CHIEF JUSTICE MOHAMMED BELLO 207, of Appendix 7
(M.Kamil ed. 1995).
185. 9 N.W.L.R. 149, 236B (1994). It is fair to point out that before this judgement, Ademola J.C.A., in Bolaji v. Bamgbose, came nearer to the true position
when he said, "The test in section 6 subsection 6(b) must in my view be confined
to its proper limit and must not be allowed to intrude into other areas." 4
N.W.L.R. at 652F. However, to the extent that he saw the provision as relevant to
the issue of standing to sue in constitutional and statutory matters, it is submitted that he was wrong.
186. See N.N.P.C. v. Fawehinmi, 7 N.W.L.R. 598 (1998).
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section 6(6)(b), which, if adopted by the courts, will reverse the
damage that has been done to Nigerian law. It is to this decision that we must now turn.
V. THE PROPER CONSTRUCTION OF SECTION 6(6)(B)
It has been demonstrated that the Adesanya court did not
by a majority decide that section 6(6)(b) laid down a standing
requirement. What we must consider here is whether the prevailing interpretation of section 6(6)(b) is correct. Recall that
neither the text of section 6(6)(b) nor its pre-enacting history
suggests that it deals with standing to sue. Although the same
point can equally be said of Article III of the U.S. Constitution
from which a standing rule has nevertheless been derived, the
two situations are not alike.
First, there is no compelling reason for Nigerian courts to
adopt American jurisprudence, which is quite recent and has
been heavily criticized. 8 7 Recently, the High Court of Australia in Truth About Motorways Pty. Ltd. v. Macquarie Infrastructure Investment Management Ltd.,"8 refused to follow
this jurisprudence. It was argued that by purporting to confer
standing on the applicant, sections 80 and 163A of the Trade
Practices Act of 1974 (Cth) were contrary to Ch. III of the
Australian Constitution. The essence of this argument was
that since Ch. III of the Australian Constitution (i.e. sections
75 - 77 of the Constitution) is similar to Article III of the Constitution of the United States, the Lujan reasoning..9 should
equally apply in Australia. This argument was robustly rejected by Australia's Highest Court. Gaudron J pronounced:
It is convenient to note, at once, that although Ch. III of the
Constitution has significant similarities with Art. III of the

187. O.A. Bowen has referred to the, "error (not uncommon among African
scholars and judiciary) of unwholesome importation of foreign judicial decisions,
taken out of their social and political context, into the interpretation of Nigerian
law which also possesses its own distinctive siocio-political character." See Bowen,
supra note 30, at 31. It is interesting to note that a year after the Adesanya case,
Bello J.S.C. said, in Attorney-General of Bendel State v. Attorney-General of the
Fed'n, "I would further reiterate that great care should be exercised in the use of
the rules of constitutional law formulated for countries whose constitutions are not
in pari materia with our Constitution and whose ways of life are not identical
with ours." 3 N.C.L.R. at 39.
188. H.C.A. 11 (2000).
189. 504 U.S. 555 (1992)
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Constitution of the United States of America, there are, as
this Court has often noted, significant differences. In particular, the latter is concerned with "Cases" and "Controversies,"
whereas Ch. III selects "matters" as the subject-matter of
federal jurisdiction. And "matters" is a word of such generality that it necessarily takes its content from the categories of
matter which fall within federal jurisdiction and from the
concept of "judicial power." There is, thus, no reason why the
position in this country should equate precisely with that
reached in the United States of America."0
Second, the text of Article III allows for a fairly workable
standing rule, but the same cannot be said of section 6(6)(b)
because (a) it applies not only to the federal courts but also to
all state courts; and (b) it uses the specific term "civil rights" a term that unknown to the draftsman had been narrowly
equated with "private legal rights" - which necessarily controls
the nature of the standing rule and its derivative test. The
term "civil rights," as interpreted by the Nigerian courts, is
much narrower than the term "Cases" and "Controversies" in
Article III of the U.S. Constitution or the term "matters" in Ch.
III of the Australian Constitution.
If one puts aside for the moment the encrustations of authority on section 6(6)(b), its meaning appears reasonably
clear. The provision was intended to protect and confine the
judicial function. There can be no better place to find a judicial
statement on its protective function than in the speech of
Ayoola J.C.A. (with which Onalaja J.C.A. concurred) in
19 1
Ayoola J.C.A. stated:
N.N.P.C. v. Fawehinmi.
In most written constitutions, there is a delimitation of the
power of the three independent organs of government, namely: the executive, the legislature and the judiciary. Section 6
of the Constitution which vests judicial powers of the Federation and the States in the courts and defines the nature and
extent of such judicial powers does not directly deal with the
right of access of the individual to the court. The main objective of section 6 is to leave no doubt as to the definition and
delimitation of the boundaries of the separation of powers
between the judiciary on the one hand and the other organs
of government on the other, in order to obviate any claim of

190. H.C.A. 11, at para. 42 (2000).
191. 7 N.W.L.R. 598 (1998).
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the other organs of government, or even attempt by them, to
share judicial powers with the courts. Section 6(6)(b) . . . is
not intended be a catch-all, all-purpose provision to be
pressed into service for determination questions (sic) ranging
from locus standi to the most uncontroversial questions of
jurisdiction."
Section 6(6)(b), according to Ayoola J.C.A., was meant to
guarantee that "[o]ther than in consonance with the Constitution itself, legislative provisions which preclude the judiciary
from exercising its judicial powers violate the separation of
powers principles enshrined in section 6 of the Constitution."'93 His Lordship reasoned that an enactment or rule of
law will be held to infringe section 6(6)(b) if the enactment or
rule of law (a) provides for the sharing of judicial powers of the
State with any other body other than the courts in which it is
vested by the Constitution; (b) purports to remove the judicial
power vested in a court or redefines it in a manner as to whittle it; or (c) limits the extent of the power vested.'9 4 Conversely, section 6(6)(b) confines the courts to the adjudication
of justiciable matters. Hence, the determination of a political
question would be outside the scope of the judicial function.
This should not, however, be confused with the separate question of standing. Standing is concerned not with whether a
particular issue is fit for a judicial resolution, but, rather with
whether the plaintiff is the proper person to seek the intervention of the court.
VI. REDISCOVERING THE CORRECT RULES OF STANDING IN
PRIVATE AND PUBLIC LAW
It is obvious that the solution to the problem of locus standi in Nigeria is to evict section 6(6)(b) from the principle of
standing,9 but when one considers that many judges still do
not realize that there is a problem to be solved, this solution

192. Id. at 612A-C.
193. Id. at 612E. Therefore, a statute which is a legislative judgement or which
contains an ouster clause will infringe § 6(6)(b).
194. On this principle of constitutional law, see Liyanage v. The Queen, A.C.
259 (1967); Lakanmi v. Attorney-General, W. State, 1 U.I.L.R. 201 (1971).
195. This was the thesis of this author's earlier paper on the subject when it
was stated that, "any discussion of standing to sue under section 6(6)(b) is completely misplaced." See Ogowewo, supra note 33, at 18.
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may not be grasped. For instance, even though Onalaja J.C.A.
concurred in glowing terms with Ayoola J.C.A. in the N.N.P.C.
case, yet six montha later he restated in Ejiwunmi v. Costain
(WA) Plc. 9 ' the very view that Ayoola J.C.A. had debunked
to his agreement! Assuming this obstacle of ignorance is overcome, it can be envisaged that the courts may fear to tread,
what they may consider to be, the path of apostasy. First, they
may feel bound by the principle of stare decisis. However, once
it is recognized that Bello J.S.C.'s construction of section
6(6)(b) is not the ratio of the Adesanya case,'9 7 it then follows
that those cases, including those decided by the Supreme
Court, that treat Adesanya as deciding that section 6(6)(b) lays
down a rule of standing are wrong. Therefore, any court should
be free to depart from this wrong reading of Adesanya without
offending the principle of binding precedent.'98 This may very
well explain the boldness of the speech of Ayoola J.C.A. in the
N.N.P.C. case. The second reason is that because the subject of
locus standi has been hallowed through ritual incantations of
the Constitution, many may fear that adverse consequences
would result from section 6(6)(b)'s eviction. Some may even
clamor for a constitutional amendment, even though this is not
a pre-requisite for breaking the link between locus standi and
section 6(6)(b).' 99 As for the fear of adverse consequences, it

196. 12 N.W.L.R. at 167.
197. When the plaintiffs counsel in Thomas v. Olufosoye pointed out that the
Adesanya decision was not supposed to, and did not lay down a general rule of
law on locus standi to be followed in all the 'cases, Oputa J.S.C. responded, "Iia
Abraham Adesanya's case, there was no disagreement on the rationes decidendi of
the justices. Each agreed that the appeal be dismissed - the reason being that the
Appellant had no locus standi. How each of the Justices arrived at his decision that is, the way he argued it, is not as important as the decision he arrived at
based on general principles of law." 1 N.W.L.R. at 689. By focusing on conclusions,
and not the reasons that support the conclusions, the learned justice of the Supreme Court seems not to understand what constitutes the ratio of a case.
198. Oputa J.S.C., in Thomas v. Olufosoye, said of § 6, "This section has been
judicially interpreted by the Supreme Court in Senator Abraham Adesanya's case.
The decision in that case remains our law on locus standi until it is reversed by
another and contrary decision of a constitutional panel of at least 7 Justices." Id.
at 693B. It is true that the decision of the Supreme Court in Adesanya remains
the law until reversed, but the real question is what did the case decide. It certainly did not decide that § 6(6)(b) laid down a standing requirement. Therefore,
any court is free to adopt Ayoola J.C.A.'s interpretation of § 6(6)(b).
199. In Bolaji v. Bamgbose, Nnemeka-Agu J.C.A. said, "[uintil the Constitution
is amended, locus standi must of necessity, be based on the civil rights and obligations of the plaintiff." 4 N.W.L.R. 632, 658C (1986). E.X. Quansah, also has
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is impossible to imagine consequences more adverse than those
that exist at present. Indeed, before the principle of standing
was made to donne a constitutional attire, there were cases

called for a constitutional amendment. See Quansah, supra note 30, at 31. But
since § 6(6)(b) has nothing to do with standing, the standing rule can be jettisoned without an amendment of the Constitution. This does not, however, mean
that the provision cannot be better worded. A better way of drafting the provision
would have been as follows:
The judicial powers vested in accordance with the foregoing provisions of this section shall extend to all matters between persons, or
between government or authority and any person it Nigeria or haand to ell aetiens and preeeedings relating
Wea Zvenmna
thepete, fcr the deterininatien ef any question ane to the zi;-l rights
and Bbligatin ef that persen.
Three changes have been made. First, by deleting "in Nigeria," it eliminates
the possibility of the absurd argument being advanced that the courts have no
judicial power to adjudicate between a government and a person outside Nigeria.
Since the term "persons" in the first part of the clause does not include government, this is necessary. Second, by adding "or between governments," it eliminates
the possibility of the equally absurd argument being advanced that the courts
have no judicial power to adjudicate between two governments (such as
state/federal or state/local government). As presently drafted, such an argument
can be advanced because the term "persons" in the first part of the clause does
not include governments and, therefore, that clause will not apply to government/government suits. Neither does the second part of the clause cover this situation, since it contemplates suits between "government or authority and any person." Lastly, it deletes the remaining part of the clause, which is surplus. With
this deletion, the focal point of the provision changes from "civil rights and obligations" to "matters." The term "matters" in this context means justiciable matters.
As stated earlier, the aim of § 6(6)(b) is to delimit the judicial function to justiciable matters. Quite apart from common sense, there is considerable Australian
authority for this view of the function of this kind of provision. See Abebe v. Commonwealth, 73 A.L.J.R. 584, 596 (1999) (opinion of Gleeson C.J. and McHugh J.),
618 (opinion of Gummow). See also In re Judiciary and Navigation Acts, 29 C.L.R.
257, 265 (1921); Philip Morris Inc. v. Adam P. Brown Male Fashions Pty. Ltd.,
148 C.L.R. 457, 508-509 (1981) (opinion of Mason J., with whom Stephen J.
concurs); Fencott v. Muller, 152 C.L.R. 570, 606-608 (1983) (opinion of Mason,
Murphy, Brennan and Deane J.J.); Stack v. Coast Sec. (No. 9) Pty. Ltd., 154
C.L.R. 261, 278 (1983) (opinion of Gibbs C.J.), 290 (opinion of Mason, Brennan and
Deane J.J.); Mellifont v. Attorney-General (Q), 173 C.L.R. 289, 316 (1991) (opinion
of Brennan J.). On a separate note, it is appropriate to mention that § 6(6)(b) in
its previous incarnation (in the defunct 1989 constitution) was amended by the
addition of a clause that sought to abolish the doctrine of state immunity in Nigerian law. That amendment does not appear in the present 1999 Constitution or
the repealed 1979 Constitution. It would be outside the province of this work to
dwell on that confused and unnecessary amendment. However, for a devastating
critique of the amendment and the case law that led to it, see H. Ogunniran,
State Immunity from Tort Liability in Nigeria: A Critique, in A BLUEPRINT FOR
NIGERIAN LAW Ch. 15 (A.O. Obilade ed., 1995).
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where the courts categorically stated that the Constitution did
not lay down a standing requirement.0 0 No problems resulted then. Why should they now? The only problem that is envisaged is that because the error has been around for so long,
when the standing rule is abandoned many lawyers and judges
might lose their way, as the correct rules. of standing have
been lost to those reared on a wrong rule. It is these lost rules
of standing in private and public law - to which the courts
must return - that we will now consider.
A. PrivateLaw
Standing rules in private law express fundamental notions
in substantive law. In contract, for instance, the rule of privity
(the standing rule) expresses the concept of consideration. The
same can be said of the rule in Foss v. Harbottle (a standing
rule), in the law of associations which is the procedural manifestation of the principle of separate corporate personality and
the principle of majority rule.20 ' In essence, standing rules in
private law must stem from the cause of action 0 2 and not
from an external source that does not give expression to any
notion in the substantive law of the area concerned. Therefore,
once we jettison the notion that section 6(6)(b) lays down a
standing rule and test to be applied in all areas of the law,
then in private law the courts will decide what is conceptually
a locus standi issue by focusing on the cause of action. The
consequence of this will be the immediate reversal of the damage currently being inflicted on Nigerian private law. The risk
that the courts may fail to identify the applicable standing rule
in areas of private law is real. For example, the decision of the
Supreme Court in Thomas v. Olufosoye shows that where a
member of an unincorporated association brings an action in
respect of an infringement of the association's rules, the courts
may make the mistake of applying in this contractual setting a

200. Supra text accompanying notes 110-11.
201. See C. Hale, What's Right with the Rule in Foss v. Harbottle?, 1 C.F.I.L.R.
219, 222 (1997).
202. "In private law there is, in general, no separation of standing from the
elements in a cause of action." Bateman's Bay Local Aboriginal Land Council v.
The Aboriginal Community Benefit Fund Pty. Ltd., 194 C.L.R. 247, 264 (1998)
(opinion of Gaudron, Gummow and Kirby J.J.).
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standing test applicable only in public law (such as a sufficient
interest test). There is, therefore, a need for the courts to go
back to basics so as to master the substantive law in the various areas of private law.
B. Public Law
Actions for a judicial review in Nigeria can be based on
either the common law doctrine of ultra vires. 3 or the Constitution. In the case of the former, the action may be bought (i)
under the AJR procedure - the equivalent of Order 53 RSC in
England - under the relevant rules of court 20 4 or (ii) for a

203. Judicial review based on the ultra vires doctrine is the system through
which the High Court exercises supervisory control over all forms of public power.
This supervisory jurisdiction helps to ensure that public bodies not only perform
their duties, but also do not abuse their power nor act arbitrarily, capriciously,
unreasonably or unfairly. See, G. Borrie, Regulation of Public and Private Power,
P.L. 552 at 561 (1989). The basis of the courts' supervisory jurisdiction has traditionally been the ultra vires doctrine of the common law. An exception to this is
the jurisdiction of the court to quash a decision because of an error on the face of
the record; this jurisdiction which rested on a historical base emerged outside the
ultra vires doctrine. See R. v. Northumberland Comp. Appeal Tribunal, ex parte
Shaw, 1 KB. 338 (1952).
Historically, the prerogative writs of certiorari, prohibition and mandamus
were used for this supervisory purpose. Although the basis for this supervisory
jurisdiction is the common law, rules of court now lay down the procedure for
invoking the jurisdiction. In Lagos State, for example, the procedure is governed
by Order 43. This procedure is a specialised procedure by which the courts may
grant one of the prerogative remedies of certiorari, prohibition or mandamus and,
alternatively, or in addition, a declaration or injunction. Damages may also be
awarded in an application for judicial review, if one of those five remedies is
granted and the court is satisfied that damages would have been available if
claimed in an ordinary action. Where the basis of judicial review is the ultra vires
doctrine, then the three grounds categorized by Lord Diplock, which have been
accepted by the Supreme Court of Nigeria in Stitch, will apply. See Council of
Civil Serv. Unions v. Minister for the Civil Serv., A.C. 374 (1985); Stitch v. Attorney-Geneal of the Fed'n, 5 N.W.L.R. 1007 (1986). Nigerian courts will therefore
review administrative action if it is illegal, irrational or flawed by procedural impropriety.
204. See, e.g., Order 43 of the Lagos State High Court Civil Procedure Rules.
Order 43 replaced the old Order 53. Under the old Order 53 only the prerogative
remedies could be obtained. There were various problems with the old Order 53
procedure, the principal of which was that of "procedural incompatibility." It was
impossible to seek declarations, injunctions or damages (i.e. private law remedies)
in the same proceedings as those for the prerogative remedies. These private law
remedies were obtainable only in actions begun by writ or originating summons.
The prerogative remedies also had other shortcomings. Primarily, they were
hedged about with all sorts of technical limitations. They also had considerable
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declaration and injunction under the common law."' As there
is currently no procedural exclusivity rule in Nigeria,"' actions for declaratory or injunctive relief are permissible in
public law litigation, even though under the AJR procedure
such relief is now obtainable. In the case of the latter (i.e.
where the judicial review action is founded on the Constitution), it normally will be (i) to protect or enforce a fundamental
right guaranteed in Chapter IV of the Constitution or (ii) to
prevent an infraction of the Constitution, or to pronounce as
unconstitutional an infraction of the Constitution or to invalidate a law on the ground that it is constitutionally invalid. In
the case of (i) the avenue for the enforcement of fundamental
rights is provided in section 46 of the Constitution. In the case
of (ii) no special procedure is required - such actions are usually for declarations and injunctions.
Since virtually all the State High Court Rules contain the
AJR procedure, the relevant standing test under that procedure is that of "sufficient interest. " 20 7 If this test is applied,

the position on standing to sue in judicial review applications
under the AJR procedure would be akin to the position in
public law in England and the United States where liberal
standing rules apply. This will usher in a liberal standing
regime in the AJR cases. Presently, the Nigerian courts regard
the "sufficient interest" test in the rules of court on the AJR
procedure as simply stating that standing should be shown -

procedural disadvantages - an absence of an automatic right to discovery, crossexamination and general interlocutory relief. Furthermore, there were problems
related to standing as different standing rules applied to the different remedies.
205. The problems associated with the old Order 53 actions led the courts to
adapt private law remedies of the injunction and declaration in the service of
public law. In Iwuji v. Fed'l Corm'r for Establishment, Attorney-General of the
Fed'n, Eso J.S.C. said, "The two reliefs sought are declaratory . . . and I think a
declaratory action is more advantageous, in this regard, to the applicant than
seeking a judicial review by Prerogative Action." 1 N.W.L.R. 497, 507 (1985). His
Lordship was simply repeating in his own words, the words of Lord Denning, in
O'Reilly v. Mackman (CA.), that, "[w]hilst the darkness still prevailed, we let in
some light by means of a declaration." 2 A.C. 237, 253 (1983). The House of Lords
has now put an end to this. There is now a procedural dichotomy between public
and private law in the sense that as a general rule it would be contrary to public
policy and be an abuse of court process for a plaintiff in a public law matter to
seek redress by ordinary action. This is known as the procedural exclusivity rule.
206. See discussion, supra note 204.
207. See Federal High Court (Civil Procedure) Rules Act 1999, supra note 11,
Order 43, r. 3(5).
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which they already regard as a constitutional imperative - and
they then apply the section 6(6)(b) test to determine standing.
But once that test ceases to apply, the courts will have to apply the liberal "sufficient interest" test contained in the rules.
In England, the following have been granted standing pursuant to this test: a journalist who sought a declaration that the
policy adopted by the chair of the justices of not revealing the
names of sitting magistrates in certain circumstances for security reasons was unlawful;. 8 an NGO with an interest in environmental matters that challenged certain authorisations
given to British Nuclear Fuels Ltd by the Pollution Inspectorate and the Agriculture Minister for the discharge of nuclear
waste; 2 9 a pressure group that challenged the decision of the
Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs to
grant overseas aid for the purpose of constructing a hydroelectric power station in Malaysia; 20 and a citizen who - "because of his sincere concern for constitutional issues" - challenged the ratification of a treaty.1 It is, therefore, obvious
that a "sufficient interest" test under the AJR procedure allows
not only standing to be accorded to those with a personal interest (even where their legal rights are not in issue), but also to
those who represent the "public interest."
However, considering that there are other kinds of judicial
review proceedings in Nigeria outside the AJR procedure and
each kind has its own standing test, it is necessary for us to
identify the traditional standing tests in the other different
types of judicial review proceedings. Where judicial review is
by action for a declaration and or injunction - the preferred
form of action in Nigeria in administrative and constitutional
matters212 - the traditional common law standing test was

208. See R. v. Felixstowe J.J., ex parte Leigh, Q.B. 582 (1987).
209. See R. v. Inspectorate of Pollution, ex parte Greenpeace Ltd. (No. 2), 4 All
E.R. 329 (1994).
210. See R. v. Foreign Secy, ex parte World Movement Ltd., 1 W.L.R. 386
(1995).
211. See R. v. Secy of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, ex parte
Rees-Mogg, Q.B. 552 (1994).
212. In Attorney-General of Anambra State v. Okafor, the Supreme Court pointed out that anyone whose rights are infringed by the exercise of statutory power
by an authority vested with such power can challenge its exercise by seeking a
declaratory order. 2 N.W.L.R. 396 (1992). It must be said that with the presence
of the new Order 43 there is much to be said for the application of a procedural
exclusivity rule.
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quite strict. It was as strict as the test derived from section
6(6)(b). For instance, it has been said of the declaration that, it
is "by its very nature... of no avail to a plaintiff not invested
with legal rights which are capable of being declared."2 13
When the section 6(6)(b) rule is abandoned, the question will
arise as to whether or not to apply the traditional strict tests
in such judicial review actions. It is my view that the courts
should" apply a liberal test in this context. Take the case of
unconstitutional behavior. The application of a test that focuses on private legal rights (i.e. the traditional test in respect of
declaratory relief) will have the effect of insulating unconstitutional behaviour from attack, considering that the AttorneyGeneral is not likely to sue his own government. Liberality
does not, however, mean that an actio popularis should be
recognised.2 14 It is, therefore, suggested that the courts
should apply a "sufficient interest" test in this context, notwithstanding the absence of explicit authority in the rules of
court." 5 Under such a test, the courts can give standing to a
plaintiff who clearly demonstrates an interest higher than that
of the ordinary member of society, even though this interest
does not amount to a legal right. The benefit of this test is that
it will reverse the present situation whereby the judiciary unwittingly allows legislative and executive constitutional violations to go unchecked. In the case of unlawful administrative
action that is challenged by action for declaratory or injunctive
relief, a sufficient interest test should equally be applied. Such
a test would have the benefit of ensuring that a uniform test
applies to all cases of unlawful administrative action, regard-

213. G.L. Peiris, The Doctrine of Locus Standi in Commonwealth Administrative
Law, P.L. 52, 70 (1983).
214. There are three reasons why the floodgate argument has force in this
context. First, since the challenges will not be under the AJR procedure, there
would be no filtering mechanism to weed out frivolous litigants. Secondly, the
award of costs in Nigeria is so derisory that it has never been regarded as a
discouragement to litigation. Lastly, because lawsuits are greatly subsidised from
the public purse, litigants in Nigeria have an incentive to sue in a manner that
involves a huge social cost.
215. A similar departure from the strict rule applicable to the declaration was
made in Canada in, Thorson v. Attorney General of Canada (No. 2), 43 D.L.R. (3d)
1 (Canada) (1974). It will also be recalled that Lord Denning had done likewise in
Attorney-General ex rel. McWhirter v. Indep. Broadcasting Auth., Q.B. 629, 649
(1973), before Gouriet v. Union of Post Office Workers, AC 435 (1978), was decided.
See also Olawoyin v. Attorney-General, N. Nig., 1 All N.L.R. 269 (1961).

582

BROOK. J. INT'L L.

[Vol. XXVI:2

less of how the action is brought. In short, it is this writer's
view that once the section 6(6)(b) standing rule is jettisoned,
then in the entire domain of Nigerian public law a sufficient
interest test should apply. This sensible approach has commended itself to rational systems of law, and Nigeria will do
itself no credit if it continues to apply a standing test that focuses on the infringement of a legal right. The underlying
philosophical bases of such a liberal standing test in public law
are "communitarian" and "expository" principles of constitutional law adjudication.216 The former supports a liberal
standing test by recognizing that the public, rather than only
the victim of a constitutional rights violation, has a legitimate
interest in the observance by the State of constitutional guarantees. 217 According to Joanna Miles, this model prevents the
"privatization" of human rights violations" 8 - a hallmark of a
standing rule that focuses on the infringement or threatened
infringement of a person's legal rights. The model allows persons with a genuine desire and capacity to vigorously pursue a
suit to bring such cases to the courthouse, even where the
victim of the rights violation refuses to sue. The expository
principle, by viewing the judicial function as being primarily
the exposition of legal principles, rather than simply the resolvers of disputes, supports a broad standing rule that does
not focus on the characteristics of the plaintiff.1 9 This is because judicial pronouncements in this sphere affect a multitude of persons not before the court (unlike the position in
private law) and clarify the proper interpretation of constitutional provisions not just for the case at hand, but to all future
interactions between governments (federal, state, local) and
citizens and governments.220
This transcendental construct can be concretized by considering an aspect of the recent controversy generated by the
introduction of the Sharia in some of the States in Nigeria.2 1

216. See J. Miles, Standing Under the Human Rights Act 1998: Theories of
Rights Enforcement & the Nature of Public Law Adjudication, 59 C.L.J. 133

(2000).
217.
218.
219.
220.
221.
died in

See id. at 136.
See id. at 148.
See id. at 136.
See id. at 153.
The BBC reported that in February and May 2000 more than 1,300 people
riots over the Sharia issue in the northern city of Kaduna in Nigeria. See
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Pursuant to sections 144 and 145 of the Zamfara State Sharia
Penal Code Law No. 10 of 2000, Zamfara State recently amputated a convicted cow thief.22 Even though the Sharia is
widely (but not always accurately) believed to be unconstitutional,r neither the convict who was amputated nor the Federal Government has sought to challenge the constitutionality
of this law. Hence, the question arises, whether any NGO concerned with civil liberties in Nigeria will have standing to sue,
even where the victim has not challenged the constitutionality
of the law? A communitarian and expository model of constitutional adjudication, by supporting a broad sufficient interest
test, should accord an NGO standing in such circumstances. 2" While it is certain that the NGO is not the immediate

BBC Report (June 29, 2000), available at http://news6.thdo.bbc.co.uk/hi/english/
world/africa/newsid%5F811000/811548.htm.
222. See Zamfara Amputates Cow Thief, in POST EXPRESS, at
http://www.postexpresswired.com (last visited March 25, 2000).
223. At a general level, there is nothing unconstitutional about the introduction
of the Sharia in any State of Nigeria. There is no reason why Delta or Zamfara
State should not be able to introduce Sharia Law of Tort or Contract, for example,
since these areas fall within the legislative competence of the States. Unconstitutionality arises only if (a) the law in question prescribes a state religion or (b)
contravenes any of the fundamental rights in Chapter IV of the Constitution or (c)
conflicts with any other aspect of the Constitution. Applying this test, the aspect
of Zamfara's State penal code that prescribes amputation as punishment for theft
is unconstitutional. This is because it violates the constitutional provision in Ch.
IV that provides that "Every individual is entitled to respect for the dignity of his
person, and accordingly - (a) no person shall be subject to torture or to inhuman
or degrading treatment." Even under the present standing rule, a diligent Federal
Attorney General should be able to invoke the courts to test the constitutionality
of such a Sharia law, since he has a duty to do so pursuant to the combined
effect of § 5(1)(b) and § 150(1) of the 1999 Constitution (if this is regarded as
Nigeria's constitution) or the combined effect of § 5(1)(b) and § 138(1) of the 1979
Constitution (if this is regarded as Nigeria's constitution, as this writer has argued).
224. If the Federal Attorney-General refuses to go to court, as presently seems
to be the case, it would follow that under the present rule of standing, it would
be impossible for a litigant to question the constitutionality of such a Sharia law
if the litigant is unable to make a showing that the impugned law infringes or
threatens his or her legal rights. However, once the § 6(6)(b) rule is swept aside,
as this article argues, there should be no reason why a person who has a sufficient interest should not be able to go to court. Such a person will be a relevant
NGO, although it need not be confined to such persons. Lord Diplock explained,
"It would, in my view, be a grave lacuna in our system of public law if a pressure group, like the federation, or even a single public-spirited taxpayer, were
prevented by outdated technical rules of locus standi from bringing the matter to
the attention of the court to vindicate the rule of law and get the unlawful conduct stopped." R. v. IRC, ex parte Nat'l Fed'n of Self-Employed, A.C. 617, 644
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victim of the rights violation, Klass v. FRG2" (a decision of
the European Commission of Human Rights interpreting the
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms - the provenance of Chapter IV of the Nigerian Constitution) shows that legislation can be challenged by a
person without it being necessary for him to show that specific
measures under the legislation have been taken against him.
Finally, in cases where there has been an infringement or
threatened infringement of a person's fundamental rights contained in Chapter IV of the Constitution, the standing requirement would seem at first glance to be indicated in section
46(1), which provides, "any person who alleges that any of the
provisions of this Chapter has been, is being or likely to be
contravened in any State in relation to him may apply to a
High Court in that State for redress." However, it is arguable
that this provision only makes it abundantly clear that the
person whose rights have been infringed or threatened should
be able to sue; and that it does not go as far as taking away a
right to sue that is vested in a third party by the common law.
An example of such is the writ of habeas corpus, which is obtainable in respect of a Chapter IV right. It has been said by
Madden C.J. in the Australian case of R. v. Waters. 6 that,
"[a]nybody in the community who knows that a person is
wrongfully imprisoned has a right to have the writ to discharge that person out of the imprisonment." Furthermore, as
stated above, the European Commission of Human Rights in
Klass v. FRG has demonstrated that the concept of "victim"
can be broadly interpreted. In fact, the matter can be tested by
considering the following situation: a person is wrongly deprived of his life in violation of Chapter IV of the Constitution.
Yet, the wording of the constitutional guarantee of the right to
life and section 46, if literally construed, would suggest that no
suit would be permissible by any person other than the person
whose life is wrongly terminated. This would, in effect, mean
that close relatives of the deceased will be unable to bring an
action in their own right based on the violation of the constitutional guarantee. This would be a paradoxical result. Clearly,

(1982).
225. 2 E.H.R.R. 214 (1978).
226. V.L.R. 372, 375 (1912).
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what this demonstrates is that there is a need to interpret
section 46 broadly. This is how the functionally equivalent
provision of the European Convention on Human Rights has
been construed. 7
VII. CONCLUSION
If by logical reasoning from premises, conclusions arrived
at are contrary to common sense and justice, then we ought to
go back and examine the premises to see if they are sound.
This is what this article has done. It has been demonstrated
that the so-called Nigerian law of standing, whose assumed
constitutional basis has been shown to be manifestly false and
whose illogicality is incandescent, is the result of a catalogue of
errors. Chronologically, and in an ascending order of gravity,
the first error lies in the drafting of section 6(6)(b) by - on their
own admission - an over-worked body of amateur draftsmen
operating under a severe time-constraint. Since the term "civil
rights" had already been judicially defined very narrowly, it
would have been better not to use the term in section 6(6)(b).
Its presence in the provision is not, however, a significant
cause of the locus standi problem. It is merely a part of a matrix of more critical errors. The second error was the misplaced
application of U.S. jurisprudence on Article III to section
6(6)(b) by Justice Bello in the Adesanya case. Although this
was critical, it was merely the error of one judge out of seven.
The third error was the misreading of the Adesanya case by
the Supreme Court. This was the most grievous error of all. It
led to the adoption of Justice Bello's rule as the principle of the
Adesanya case. It was this misreading of Adesanya that led to
the discovery of a fallacious rule of standing based on section
6(6)(b). The universal nature of the rule meant that it had to
apply across the gamut of Nigerian law. Thus, by conducting
section 6(6)(b) into territory where it can only be described as a
trespasser, the supreme tribunal has done incalculable damage
to the edifice of Nigerian law.

227. See art. 34 (previously art. 25, prior to the ratification of Protocol 11). It
has been held that close relatives of a person killed in alleged violation of art. 2
of the Convention are indirectly affected and, accordingly, entitled to bring an
action in their own right based on that violation. See also Mrs. W. v. U.K., 32
D.R. 190 (1983).
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Only the poor forensic skills of the courts can explain the
longevity of this rule, which has infected all regions of Nigerian jurisprudence. The jurists that ought to have dispelled the
darkness with illuminative analyses failed to discredit the rule;
at the highest, their discourses have been limited to condemning unjust results, without appreciating that it is the structure
of the law that has produced such results. If they had for once
adverted their attention to whether the locus standi test was
functional, perhaps its sheer crudity would have forced them to
investigate whether the Supreme Court in Adesanya did, in
fact, decide that section 6(6)(b) laid down a requirement of
standing. Apart from vandalising Nigerian law in the various
doctrinal categories in private and public law, the Supreme
Court, through the standing rule, also has undermined the
rule of law. Gani Fawehinmi, a leading Nigerian constitutional
lawyer, observed after the Adesanya case that the danger
posed by locus standi "is potent and must be nipped in the bud
in Nigeria, as it is capable of leading to terrible injustice. It
can be used by the other arms of Government - Legislative and
Executive - to cover unconstitutional iniquities."2 " It hardly
needs pointing out that the consequence of a persistent enfeeblement of the rule of law is that Nigeria will move closer to a
civilian dictatorship; and a military dictatorship becomes likely
when there is a civilian dictatorship.
VIII. POSTSCRIPT
The latest word on standing to sue in Nigeria is the decision of the Supreme Court in Owodunni v. Registered Trustees
of Celestial Church and Bada and Ors."' At first glance, it
appears that the Supreme Court has at last accepted this
writer's thesis - first advanced in 1995230 and given firm judicial support by the Court of Appeal in N.N.P.C v.
Fawehinmi"1 - that the Adesanya court did not by a majority
decide that section 6(6)(b) of the Constitution laid down a requirement of standing. Reviewing the Adesanya case,

228.
229.
230.
231.

See Fawehinmi, supra note 30, at vii.
6 S.C. (Part III) 60 (2000).
Ogowewo, supra note 33.
7 N.W.L.R. 598 (1998).
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Ogundare J.S.C. pronounced "From the extracts of their
Lordships' judgements I have quoted above one can clearly see
that there was not majority (sic) of the court in favor of Bello
J.S.C's interpretation of section 6 subsection (6)(b) of the Constitution." 2 Further down his Lordship stated "In my respectful view, I think Ayoola J.C.A. (as he then was) correctly
set out the scope of section 6 subsection (6)(b) of the Constitution . .

in N.N.P.C v. Fawehinmi & Ors.""3 These pro-

nouncements, which were not obiter dicta, received the unanimous agreement of the remaining Justices. It, therefore, appears that the foundation of the Nigerian standing doctrine
has been demolished by this decision. It cannot even be argued
that as the case was not decided by a full (seven member)
Panel of the Supreme Court, the five member Panel is not
competent to overrule the full Panel that decided Adesanya.
This is because the Owodunni court did not purport to depart
from Adesanya - all it did was show that Adesanya had been
wrongly interpreted in subsequent cases.
It is, however, too early to hold a requiem on the standing
doctrine for three reasons. First, it is rather strange that such
a legal, revolution - for that is what it is - could occur without

the other members of the Panel (apart from simply concurring)
having anything to say about the change. Their silence on this
point is deafening. It leaves one with the impression that they
may not have appreciated the significance of this aspect of the
case. Secondly, it appears that even Justice Ogundare did not
appreciate the full implication of his pronouncements. This is
because after stating that section 6(6)(b) was not relevant to
locus standi, a few paragraphs later - obviously led into error
by a view put forward by Ademola J.C.A. in Bolaji v.
Bamgbose"4 - he proceeded to state that section 6(6)(b) was
relevant to locus standi in constitutional litigation! 5 Lastly,
232. Owodunni, 6 S.C. (Part III) at 82.
233. Id. at 83.
234. See Bolaji v. Bamgbose, 4 N.W.L.R. 632, 652F (1986) (opinion of Ademola
J.C.A.). See supra note 185.
235. See Owodunni, 6 S.C. at 83-84. Ogundare J.S.C. states, "I think there is
some wisdom in the views expressed by his Lordship Ademola J.C.A. The judgements delivered in the Adesanya case seem to support him. The term 'civil
rights and obligations' applies more in the sphere of public law." Id. This is clearly wrong. See supra at § II. It is either that § 6(6)(b) contains a rule of standing
or it does not. There is nothing to suggest that it does or that it does only in
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there are sixteen Justices on the Supreme Court, five of whom
sat on this particular Panel. It is very likely that a different
Panel of the court may go back to section 6(6)(b) in discussions
on standing." For these reasons, one must resist the temptation at this point to sing a dirge for the standing doctrine.
Where does this leave the law? In the Owodunni case, Justice
Ogundare began his judgement by observing that:
This appeal raises once again the vexed question of locus
standi which, in spite of a plethora of decided cases on it, still
remains a Gordian Knot. A number of judicial pronouncements have been made and academic papers written. Rather
than the problem being solved, it has become more intractable as the case now on hand demonstrates.s 7

constitutional matters.
236. Quite apart from the above weaknesses, a different Panel of the Supreme
Court could rightfully point to the fact that Ogundare J.S.C. was wrong when he
stated that Bello J.S.C.'s construction of § 6(6)(b) was the minority position in the
Adesanya case. To reach this conclusion, Ogundare J.S.C. opined that Idigbe J.S.C
did not subscribe to Bello J.S.C's construction. But this is wrong. Idigbe J.S.C said
that, "[flor the reasons given by my learned brother, Bello J.S.C. I agree that the
plaintiff . . . has no locus standi to prosecute the claims in these proceedings." 1
All N.L.R. (Part 1) 1, 80 (1981). Further down, he expresses his agreement with
the point in issue in even more direct language. Id. at 42. When Idigbe J.S.C's
speech is carefully analyzed, it will be seen that he saw § 6(6)(b) as dealing with
separation of powers and as laying down a standing requirement. By viewing §
6(6)(b) as laying down a requirement of standing, Idigbe J.S.C. was clearly agreeing with Bello J.S.C. The correct position, as has been demonstrated, supra at §
III(B), is that the Adesanya court was divided equally on this issue.
237. See Owodunni v. Registered Trustees of Celestial Church and Bada and
Ors, 6 S.C. (Part III) at 62. The case did not involve any difficulty. Shorn of all
adornments, the case involved a claim by a member of a voluntary association to
enforce one of the terms of the contract - the right to insist on constitutional
behaviour by the association. In this context, as stated earlier (see text accompanying nn. 147-149) the false § 6(6)(b) rule causes no difficulty.
The plaintiff in this case challenged the appointment of Bada to the office
of Pastor of the Celestial Church of Christ, as being in violation of Article 111 of
the church's constitution, the purport of which was that the appointment of the
Pastor by the church was a matter of divine choice to be revealed to, "the erstwhile incumbent." As can be expected in matters of religion, the church's doctrine
(as indicated by its constitution) accepted the co-existence of the physical and
spiritual spheres with no clear separation.
The constitution of the church in many of ijs Articles clearly showed that
the church believed in saints and in the transmission of messages from the spiritual world to those in the physical world. Crucially, Article 111 did not go on to
stipulate the mode by which this divine revelation to the erstwhile incumbent was
to be expressed to the church before the person is named and proclaimed the
successor by the church. After the Pastor died without formally appointing a successor, Bada was named and proclaimed "Pastor" by the church. The defendants
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Even though the citadel of the standing doctrine has been
severely assaulted, a pessimist may opine that perhaps not
much has changed.

maintained that Bada was the divine choice and that the revelation of this to the
erstwhile Pastor (at a time when he was dead but regarded as having a spiritual
existence as a saint) was expressed to the church metaphysically in the form of
"spiritual messages" through "visionaries," and that this was in accordance with
Article 111. Having broken the link between locus standi and § 6(6)(b), the court
accepted the principle that in matters of private law, the issue of standing is
subsumed within the cause of action. Since the cause of action in the case was
breach of contract, the plaintiff (the rule of privity having been satisfied) had a
right to sue on the contract. (It is noteworthy that even this elementary point
confused the Court of Appeal and to some extent the Supreme Court, as they kept
referring to the standing test not in terms of privity but as a "sufficient interest"
test; a test applicable only in public law.)
There were, however, two limitations that should have debarred the plaintiff
from suing in this case, but the court was oblivious of both. First, a member may
be debarred from suing by the rule in Foss v. Harbottle. This is a rule (which
applies to corporate and unincorporated associations) that precludes suits by minorities in respect of matters within the control of the majority of members. (In
Mozley v. Alston, 1 Ph 790 (1847), it was held that a minority of members of a
railway company who challenged the usurpation of the defendants to the office of
director could not sue because this was a matter for the majority to decide.) This
rule helps to prevent futile suits. It prevents a situation where the court reaches
a decision only for the majority of members to overrule the decision - a fact that
eventually occurred in this saga. Second, a member will be debarred from suing in
respect of a matter where there is no intention to create legal relations. Even
though the manner of appointment of the Pastor in this case was clearly a matter
of spiritual doctrine (unlike the case of the Anglican Church in Thomas v.
Olufosoye) and, therefore, not justiciable, the Supreme Court wrongly ventured into
spiritual territory and ruled that Bada's appointment was void.
The appropriate answer to the question posed to the court was that there
was no intention to create legal relations in respect of this matter and, therefore,
there was no cause of action for breach of contract. Put simply, the contract of the
members of Celestial Church of Christ did not extend to the appointment of the
Pastor, since this appointment was to be by divine choice, as revealed to the erstwhile Pastor and expressed by him to the church in an unspecified manner that
embraced even the metaphysical. The Supreme Court assumed that just because
the Pastor died without making an appointment, Article 111 had not been complied with, even though the church's doctrine contemplated that the communication
of the divine choice through the Pastor could be made to the church when he assumed the role of a saint. By this decision, the court, in effect, reached the bizarre conclusion that matters of spiritual ecclesiastic doctrine are justiciable.

